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This thesis identifies the major factors faced by the Program Manager in developing and 
implementing the integrated logistics support plan (ILSP) for the U.S. Army's Special Operations 
Aircraft (SOA), the MH-60K and MH-47E. The SOA Program had many unique characteristics which 
made it a prime candidate for identification of major factors and development of lessons learned. Two 
of those unique characteristics are the facts that it was designated a nondevelopmental item (NDI) 
acquisition, and the fact that it is an extremely low density weapon system. Effective integrated 
logistics support (ILS) planning poses a challenge in "normal" developmental programs. Ensuring that 
ILS is handled effectively in low density NDI acquisitions can be a significantly more difficult 
challenge for the acquisition professional. This thesis develops a case study of ILS in the unique 
environment of the SOA Program. It also analyzes four maintenance specific ILS elements in an 
attempt to identify major factors that significantly impacted the development and implementation of 
the SOA ILSP. From these major factors, numerous lessons learned are developed. Some of the more 
important lessons learned are that Sustainment oflow density weapon systems is far more complicated 
and expensive through separate small Program Management Offices than it is through existing Program 
Management Offices; The density of the weapon system being procured is one of the most important 
factors to consider when making key ILS decisions; and, Logistics Support Analysis tailoring and use 
are critical to establishing and implementing successful ILS in weapon systems. Study of the major 
factors and lessons learned presented in this thesis should improve the future development and 
implementation ofiLSPs in Special Operations Aviation programs and NDI programs as a whole. 
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This thesis concentrates on the issues associated with integrated logistics support (ILS) 
in Special Operations Aviation systems. Specifically, it analyzes the Integrated Logistics 
Support Plan (ILSP) of the Special Operations Aircraft (SOA) Program and establishes 
practical "lessons learned" based on the formulation and implementation of this plan. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In April of 1986 the SOA Program was initiated by Headquarters, Department of the 
Army (DA) in response to the Department of Defense (DoD) Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) Airlift Report and the SOF Expedited Essential Required Operational Capability. This 
program was initiated to fulfill the operational requirement of a "US Army aircraft ... capable 
of performing clandestine, deep penetration airlift missions in adverse weather with limited 
lighting and visibility during night or day conditions over all types of terrain." [Ref. 1] 
This validated requirement was based on the perceived limited ability of the UH-60L 
(Blackhawk) and CH-47D (Chinook) helicopters to perform special operations missions. The 
limitations of these aircraft were grouped into three broad categories: (1) performance 
characteristics; (2) vulnerability to threat weapon systems; and (3) limited self-deployability. 
In order to overcome these limitations, the SOA Program began the design, integration, 
modification and qualification of a Mission Equipment Package (MEP). 
The MEP consisted of an Integrated Avionics Subsystem (lAS) to enhance 
communications and navigation, a multimode radar (MMR) to include terrain following and 
terrain avoidance capability, an improved Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) suite, 
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increased armament to include upgraded suppressive weapons, the addition of external and 
internal fuel tanks and air-to-air refueling provisions, upgraded and improved engines (CH-
47D) and an upgraded transmission (UH-60L). When fielded, the UH-60L and CH-47D 
aircraft would be redesignated as the MH-60K and MH-4 7E. [Ref 1] (See Figure 1.1 and 
Figure 1.2.) 
The SOA Program was obviously not a traditional "new start," developmental 
program. Rather, it was a modification and integration type program. Because of this, the 
SOA Program was designated a nondevelopmental item (NDI) program in accordance with 




Infrared Sensor System 









Figure 1.2. MH-47E Configuration From [Ref. 3] 
Although the use ofNDis in the acquisition process is not a new concept, their use has 
received a great deal of emphasis in recent years. This increased emphasis is a direct result 
of Congressional mandates to use more commercial business practices in the acquisition of 
weapon systems. With this "new charter," it is critical that acquisition professionals have a firm 
understanding of the many benefits and challenges that NDI acquisitions provide to the 
systems acquisition process and to the process user. 
Some of the benefits of using an NDI acquisition strategy include: application of state-
of-the-art technology to current requirements; quick response to operational needs; 
elimination or reduction of research and development costs; and reduction of cost, schedule, 
and performance risks. Some of the challenges that NDI acquisitions present include: the 
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possibility of items developed for other than DoD needs not meeting all requirements; mission 
performance trade-offs being required to gain advantages from pursuing NDI alternatives; 
product modifications complicating configuration management; questionable continued 
product availability; and, the subject of this thesis, challenging logistics supportability. [Ref 
4] 
Effective ILS planning and implementation pose a challenge in developmental 
programs, even with all of the. training and guidance that acquisition personnel receive. 
Ensuring that ILS is handled effectively in NDI acquisitions can be a significantly more 
difficult challenge to acquisition personnel because of the differences in the NDI acquisition 
process. First and foremost among those differences is the compressed acquisition life cycle. 
The compressed acquisition life cycle effectively reduces the amount of time available 
for planning and developing organic logistics support. ILS activities that normally take place 
during the demonstration and validation (DEMV AL) and the engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) phases of the acquisition life cycle must be accelerated to ensure that 
effective support is developed or procured for the system. Additionally, logistics support may 
be adversely impacted by rapidly evolving NDI hardware and software since DoD may not be 
acquiring sufficient technical data and technical-data rights to maintain configuration control 
of commercial items. [Ref 4] 
Acquisition personnel must be sensitive to these, and other, challenges and ensure that 
they are addressed early in the acquisition process. They must understand that implementing 
effective ILS for NDis will probably require a departure from the "normal" procedures of a 
developmental item acquisition. The "non-normal" procedures required to effectively develop 
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and implement ILS within an NDI program establish the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
The SOA Program was my vehicle for exploring that concept. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to identify and examine the major factors in the SOA 
Program that had a significant impact on the development and implementation of the 
Program's ILSP. From this, I will develop ILS related lessons learned that will benefit 
acquisition managers and their staffs in the effective development and implementation of 
ILSPs for their own low density NDI programs. 
A secondary objective of this thesis is to develop possible solutions to current ILS 
implementation problems with the MH-60K and MH-47E. These solutions will benefit all 
personnel directly involved in the logistics support of these aircraft. (The solutions developed 
will not be disclosed in this thesis. Instead, the solutions will be provided directly to the 
Assistant Program Manager (APM) for Material Readiness and Logistics at the Technology 
Applications Program Office (TAPO).) 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In pursuing the objective(s) of this thesis, the following primary research question 
guided my efforts: What major factors in the SOA Program had a significant impact on the 
development and implementation of the Program's ILSP and what lessons can be learned from 
those factors? 
The subsidiary research questions that I used to determine the answer to the primary 
research question are: 
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1. What is integrated logistics support; what is nondevelopmental item acquisition; 
and, how does integrated logistics support differ in nondevelopmental item 
acquisition? 
2. What is the Special Operations Aircraft Program, and to what extent are the 
aircraft in this program modified over regular Army aircraft? 
3. What are the specifics of the Special Operations Aircraft Program's Integrated 
Logistics Support Plan? 
4. Has the Special Operations Aircraft Program's Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
been successfully implemented? 
5. What factors were identified as critical during the development and implementation 
of the Special Operations Aircraft Program's Integrated Logistics Support Plan? 
6. What Integrated Logistics Support related lessons learned can be gained from the 
Special Operations Aircraft Program? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The main thrust of this thesis is on ILS. Specifically, the study concentrates on ILS 
within nondevelopmental programs. To further narrow the scope of research, I concentrated 
my efforts on the peculiarities of SOF aviation acquisition programs, and the SOA Program 
in particular. SOF aviation acquisition programs generally consist of small quantity purchases 
of technologically advanced hardware. This combination of factors increases the difficulty of 
ILS support beyond that of a "normal" NDI program and warrants consideration on its on 
accord. 
In this thesis I establish a baseline for ILS by describing what DoD and DA consider 
to be ILS. I also provide a description ofNDI acquisitions in order to set the ground work for 
a description ofiLS in nondevelopmental programs. Next, I provide a description of the SOA 
Program, the aircraft involved in the Program, and the Program's ILSP. This will provide the 
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reader with an understanding of the technology involved in the Program as well as an 
appreciation for the depth of ILS planning that took place in the Program. After this 
foundation information is presented, I present an analysis of the adequacy of the SOA 
Program's ILSP. This analysis was based on the level of success achieved during the 
implementation of the ILSP on the fielded aircraft. From this analysis, I establish lessons 
learned that may be applicable to other acquisition programs. 
2. Limitations 
The analysis of the SOA Program's ILSP was limited to the following ILS elements: 
(1) Maintenance Planning; (2) Supply Support; (3) Support Equipment; and (4) Technical 
Data (maintenance publications only). The remaining six ILS elements were not analyzed for 
the following reasons: ( 1) Manpower and Personnel was not analyzed because there was no 
increase in manpower and no increase in military operational specialties deemed necessary; (2) 
Computer Resources Support was not analyzed because it was managed under a separate 
document and a separate functional area of the PMO; (3) Training and.Training Support was 
not analyzed in an intentional effort to limit the scope of the analysis to maintenance and 
supply related activities; ( 4) Facilities was not analyzed because existing UH-60L and CH-4 7D 
facilities were deemed adequate for the SOA; (5) Packaging, Handling, Storage, and 
Transportation was not analyzed because there was no change anticipated in this area; and (6) 
Design Interface was not analyzed because of the limited influence it has in NDI acquisitions. 
Other areas that were intentionally not explored in this thesis include: ILS and its 
relation to the systems engineering process; test and evaluation (T &E) considerations in the 
ILS process; ILS funding considerations; ILS transition activities from one phase of the 
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acquisition life cycle to the next; Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support (CALS); and 
the specifics of Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability. These areas, while extremely 
important, are extensive enough to warrant independent analysis. 
This thesis is further limited by the fluid state of the acquisition process in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The names of some of the ILS elements have changed since the SOA 
Program's development of the ILSP. Some terminology has changed with the passage of 
time. Etc. . . In an attempt to negate the effect of these changes on this thesis, I used the most 
current terminology and methodology in writing it. The one exception to this comes with the 
intentional nonuse of the new DoD 5000 series (dated 11 October 1995). These directives 
implement the many changes associated with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(F ASA). While I was writing this thesis, the DoD 5000 series was still in draft form; therefore, 
I chose to utilize the most recent, non draft, versions of the DoD 5000 series publications. 
3. Assumptions 
The primary assumption that I made in this thesis is that logical and useful ILS lessons 
learned can be derived from an analysis of a recently implemented ILSP. Another key 
assumption associated with this first assumption is that personnel intimately involved with the 
implementation of an ILSP are the most qualified to provide realistic, current, and relevant 
insight into the ILS process. 
Another assumption that I made in this thesis is that the reader has a working 
knowledge of the DoD acquisition process. Therefore, no effort was made to explain the 
requirements generation process, the phases of the acquisition process, or the ILS related 
considerations in those phases. 
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The final assumption that I made in this thesis is that the lessons learned from this 
study will still be applicable after the full implementation of the F ASA. Even with the 
streamlining of the acquisition process, the basic ~S planning and implementation elements 
remain intact and critical to the successful, and financially supportable, fielding of modem 
weapon systems. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
I conducted this thesis as a case study, with an analysis of the implementation of the 
SOA Program's ILSP. The research methodology for this thesis consisted of an extensive 
literature review, a detailed analysis of SOA Program documentation, and in-depth interviews 
with SOA Program knowledgeable personnel. 
The first subsidiary research question was answered through a review of the latest 
available DoD Directives (DoDD), Army Regulations. (AR), Department of the Army 
Pamphlets (DA Pam), Research Reports and Papers, and defense related periodicals. I 
obtained these references from the Defense Logistics Systems Information Center, fue Defense 
Technical Information Center, the Defense Systems Management College, and the Naval 
Postgraduate School's Dudley Knox Library. 
The second two subsidiary research questions were answered through a critical analysis 
of various SOA Program documentation. This documentation included the Program's ILSPs, 
Acquisition Plans, and Material Fielding Plans (MFP). These documents were provided by 
the Technology Applications Program Office (TAPO) in St. Louis Missouri. TAPO took over 
responsibility for the SOA Program in April of 1995 when the SOA Program Management 
Office (PMO) was closed. 
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The final three subsidiary research questions, as well as the primary research question, 
were answered through the use of personal interviews. These interviews were conducted with 
previous SOA PM personnel, TAPO personnel, Boeing/Sikorsky Aircraft Support (BSAS) 
personnel, and I 60th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR( A)) personnel. 
BSAS personnel are currently responsible for providing "peculiar item" intermediate and 
depot level maintenance and supply support for the MH-60K and MH-4 7E at Ft. Campbell 
Kentucky. I 60th SOAR(A) personnel are the "user" personnel of these two systems and are 
responsible for the unit and "common item" intermediate level maintenance and supply for 
the two airframes. 
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
DoD and Army definitions and acronyms used in acquisition management and the 
SOA Program are provided throughout the thesis where needed. Appendix A provides_a 
consolidated list of acronyms. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Chapter II is named -
"Background." This chapter provides the general background information necessary for the 
reader to comprehend the remainder of the study. Specifically, ILS is described, NDI 
acquisitions are described, and ILS within NDI acquisitions is described. 
Chapter III is named- "Case Description: Integrated Logistics Support in the Special 
Operations Aircraft Program." This chapter describes the systems and technology integrated 
into the SO A. It also describes the ILSP for these unique aircraft. 
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Chapter IV is named - "Analysis and Identification of Major Factors." This chapter 
analyzes the adequacy of the SOA Program's ILSP through the use of interviews conducted 
with program personnel, support personnel, and user personnel. It also provides a list of 
critical development and implementation factors derived from the analysis. 
Chapter V is named - "Lessons Learned and Conclusions." This chapter draws the 
study together, presents logically drawn lessons learned and conclusions that other acquisition 
professionals might use in the development of ILSPs in low density, NDI programs. 






The primary purpose of the acquisition process is to develop and deploy cost effective 
systems that are capable of performing their intended functions. The functional area of 
integrated logistics support (ILS) is responsible for ensuring that those systems are cost 
effective in terms oflife cycle costs (LCC) and that they can repeatedly perform their intended 
functions without burdensome maintenance and logistics efforts. 
The tasks associated with ILS that ensure that a system is capable of performing as 
stated are challenging in all types of acquisitions. They are especially challenging in non-
developmental item (NDI) acquisitions because of the unique differences in the process. This 
chapter explores some of the challenges facing ILS in NDI acquisitions. 
The chapter begins with a section on the generic ILS process. This section defines ILS 
and it's relationship to LCC and Operation and Support (O&S) costs. It also examines the 
ILS planning process, the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process, and the ILS elements. 
The next section briefly describes the NDI acquisition process and it's role in defense 
acquisition today. The final section integrates the two previous sections and examines the 
challenges and considerations ofiLS in NDI acquisitions. 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it provides the reader with a basic 
understanding of the ILS process. Second, it provides the reader with a basic understanding 
ofNDI acquisitions. And finally, it provides the reader with an understanding of some of the 
challenges that face the ILS process in NDI acquisitions. 
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B. INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
1. Background 
a. The Acquisition Logistics Problem 
Following World War ll, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into 
an era of technological competition known as the Cold War. The Cold War pitted the Soviet 
Union's strategy of quantity against the United State's strategy of quality. The Soviet Union 
believed in building tough, technically simple systems which could be produced in large 
numbers. The United States, on the other hand, relied on the projected higher kill ratios 
associated with the latest technological solutions. [Ref. 5] 
By the middle of the 1960s, the United States discovered that their 
commitment to high technology had resulted in systems that were fragile, expensive to support, 
and didn't last long when employed. The F-111 aircraft is the classic example. "Brilliant in 
concept, it was formidable on the rare occasion that everything worked and lasted for the 
duration of a mission. The amount of personnel and equipment required (to maintain it) were 
unprecedented, and the support costs were shocking." [Ref. 5] 
· It was obvious that a new philosophical approach was needed. The "new 
philosophy" was stated simply as: "influence the design of a system from its conception so that 
support was considered and life cycle costs minimized." [Ref. 5] Thus was born the concept 
of integrated logistics support. 
b. Life-Cycle Costs 
Prior to the new philosophy described above, life-cycle costs, especially O&S 
costs, had little visibility. This cost visibility problem can be related to the "iceberg effect" 
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illustrated in Figure 2.1. The importance of the new philosophy on the iceberg effect was that 
it emphasized the importance of considering not only the system acquisition cost, but other 
costs as well. 
Operations Cost 
(Personnel, Facilities, 
Utilities, and Energy) 
Poor Man-agement 
Figure 2.1. Total Cost Visibility From [Ref 6] 
In addition to considering LCC in the design of the system, the new philosophy 
also called for influencing the design early in order to minimize the LCC. Experience has 
shown that a major portion of the projected LCC for a system comes from the consequences 
of decisions made early in the systems life-cycle. Figure 2.2 shows that, while the greatest 
portion ofLCC may result from activities occurring late in the systems life-cycle (i.e. O&S 
costs (See Figure 2.3 and Table 2.1 )), the greatest opportunity to influence those costs is 
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Figure 2.3. Typical Life-Cycle Cost Distribution From [Ref 7] 
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LIFE-CYCLE COST DISTRIBUTION 
TYPICAL F-16 BRADLEY B-52 
R&D 10% 2% 2% 2% 
Production 30% 20% 14% 21% 
O&S 60% 78% 84% 77% 
Table 2.1. Life-Cycle Cost Distributions From [Ref. 5] 
alternative operational use profiles, maintenance and support policies, human-machine 
allocations, equipment packaging schemes, level of repair concepts and so on, have a great 
impact on total cost." [Ref. 6] 
c. ILS Defined 
In his book, "Logistics Engineering and Management" [Ref. 4], Benjamin S. 
Blanchard defines ILS as "a management function that provides the initial planning, funding, 
and controls which help to assure that the ultimate consumer (or user) will receive a system 
that will not only meet its performance requirements, but one that can be expeditiously and 
economically supported throughout its programmed lifecycle." He goes on to state that one 
ofthe primary objectives ofiLS is the integration of the various elements oflogistics. 
Professor Paul Mcilvaine, from the Logistics Support Department at the 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), claims that, in addition to the integration of 
the elements of logistics, there are two other areas that ILS must integrate into the total 
acquisition process. These areas are: (1) time; and (2) logistics related disciplines. (See Figure 
2.4) 
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Integration among the elements of logistics include items such as: 
• Maintenance Planning 
• Computer Resources Support 
• Facilities 
• Supply Support 
• Support and Test Equipment 
• Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation 
• Manpower and Personnel 
• Training and Training Systems 
• Technical Data 
ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICS 
MAIN1ENANCE PLANNING 
COMPUTER RESOURCES SUPPORT 
FACILITIES 
SUPPLY SUPPORT 
SUPPORT & 1EST EQUIPMENT 
PACKAGING, HANDLING, 
STORAGE &TRANSPORTATION 
MANPOWER & PERSONNEL 
TRAINING &TRAINING SYS1EMS 
1ECHNICAL DATA 
• Includes Design Interface 
TIME 
RELATED DISCIPLINES 
Figure 2.4. The Dimensions ofLogistics From [Ref 5] 
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Integration among logistics related disciplines include areas such as: 
• Cost (both design to cost and life cycle cost) 
• Systems Engineering 
• Software Engineering 
• Test and Evaluation 
• Manufacturing Management 
And integration with the specific time frames within the systems lifecycle include: 
• Conceptual Phase 
• Design and Development Phase 
• Test and Evaluation Phase 
• Manufacturing I Production I Construction Phase 
• Use Phase 
• Disposal/ Recycling Phase 
"Thus, 'Integrated' logistics support provides a three dimensional problem for the 
practitioner." [Ref. 5] 
·A more formal and precise definition ofiLS is presented in DoDI 5000.2, Part 
7 A, "Integrated Logistics Support," [Ref. 8] as 
a disciplined, unified and iterative approach to the management and technical 
activities necessary to: 
1. Develop support requirements that are related consistently to 
readiness objectives, to design, and to each other; 
2. Integrate support considerations effectively into the system and 
equipment design; 
3. Identity the most cost-effective approach to supporting the system 
when it is fielded; and 
4. Ensure that the required support structure elements are developed 
and acquired. 
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It is this definition ofiLS that the reader should associate with the word "ILS" throughout the 
remainder of this thesis. 
2. The ILS Elements 
DoD identifies ten elements which, when taken together, constitute the essential 
building blocks ofiLS. DoDI 5000.2, Part 7A, Attachment 1, "Integrated Logistics Support 
Elements" [Ref 8], states that the integrated logistics support effort will encompass the ten ILS 
elements and that each of the elements must be addressed for both hardware and software in 
both peacetime and wartime conditions." 
DoDI 5000.2 [Ref 8] defines the ten ILS elements as follows: 
• Maintenance Planning: The process conducted to evolve and establish 
maintenance concepts and requirements for the lifetime of the system. 
• Supply Support: All management actions, procedures and techniques used 
to determine requirements to acquire, catalog, receive, store, transfer, issue 
and dispose of secondary items. This includes provisioning for initial 
support as well as replenishment supply support. 
• Support Equipment All equipment, mobile or fixed, required to support 
the operation and maintenance of the system. Equipment includes 
associated multi use end items, ground-handling and maintenance 
equipment, tools, metrology and calibration equipment, test equipment and 
automatic test equipment. It includes the acquisition of logistics support 
for support and test equipment. 
• Technical Data: Scientific or technical information recorded in any form 
or medium, such as manuals and drawings. (Computer programs and 
related software are not technical data; documentation of computer 
programs and related software are. Also excluded are financial data or 
other information related to contract administration. 
• Training and Training Support: The processes, procedures, techniques, 
training devices and equipment used to train civilian, active duty and 
reserve military personnel to operate and support the system. It includes 
individual and crew training (both initial and continuation); new equipment 
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training; initial, formal, and on-the-job training; and logistics support 
planning for training equipment and training device acquisitions and 
installations. 
• Computer Resources Support: The facilities, hardware, software, 
documentation, manpower and people needed to operate and support 
embedded computer systems. 
• Facilities: The permanent, semi-permanent, or temporary real property 
assets required to support the system, including studies to define facilities 
or facility improvements, locations, space needs, utilities, environmental 
requirements, real estate requirement and equipment. 
• Packaging Handling Storage and Transportation (PHS&T): The 
resources, processes, procedures, design considerations and methods to 
ensure that all system, equipment, and support items are preserved, 
packaged, handled, and transported properly, taking into consideration 
environmental issues, equipment preservation requirements for short and 
long term storage and transportability. 
• Design Interface: The relationship oflogistics-related design parameters to 
readiness and support resource requirements. These logistics-related 
design parameters are expressed in operational terms rather than as inherent 
values, and specifically relate to system readiness objectives and support 
costs of the system. 
Eight of these ten ll..S elements focus on the logistics support resources that contribute 
to system operation and the attainment of readiness objectives in the system's operational role. 
The other two elements, Maintenance Planning and Design Interface, are directly related to 
the systems engineering management process. "During early development phases, the Design 
Interface develops the supportability influence starting at the system indenture levels. This 
dovetails with detailed Maintenance Planning and eventually results in a bottom-up 
identification of total logistics resource requirements." [Ref 7] 
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3. The Integrated Logistics Support Management Team 
As stated previously, the goal of the acquisition process is the concurrent fielding of 
a fully functional, cost-effective system, and all of the requisite items of support. The 
functional area of ILS makes its contributions to this goal through the work of the Integrated 
Logistics Support Management Team (ILSMT). 
The ILSMT has many functions to perform in order to achieve the overall goal of the 
acquisition process. Those functions include: 
• PLANNING the details of the ILS Program and their relationship with overall 
program management and ensuring coordination of logistics issues among all 
members of the government I contractor management teams. [Ref. 7] 
• "IDENTIFYING the integrated logistic support requirements (relative to each 
element) for each proposed design alternative (while the alternative exists only on 
paper)." [Ref. 5] 
• "ADVOCATING the selection of the most easily supported design alternative. 
This involves communicating the logistic support implications of each design 
alternative to the other members of the design team." [Ref. 5] 
• " ... INFLUENCING the emergence of this design toward cost-effective I 
supportable detailed design decisions." [Ref. 5] 
• "REFINING the integrated logistic support requirements (relative to each element) 
to reflect the particulars of the emerging design. This involves ensuring that the 
logistic support requirements are defined to the same depth and at the same pace 
as the emerging design." [Ref. 5] 
• " ... TESTING AND EVALUATING the planned logistic support for the product 
I system during developmental I engineering tests and during all early field tests." 
[Ref. 5] 
• " ... ACQUIRING all necessary items of support. This involves ensuring that the 
system definition includes both the system I product I service and all requisite items 
of support for each logistic element." [Ref. 5] 
• PRODUCING a quality product that conforms to the design through the reduction 
of variability in the manufacturing process. [Ref. 5] 
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• PROVIDING the system to the customers in the right place, at the right time, and 
in the right quantities completes the primary job of the ILSMT. This is done 
through the execution of a good integrated logistics support plan (ILSP) and I or 
a first rate fielding plan. [Ref. 5] 
These functions represent the true job of the ILSMT as part of the overall program 
management team. It is important to note that the execution of a modification program after 
the system has already been produced requires each of the ILSMT functions to be repeated. 
Thus ILS, "in a world of rapidly changing technology, never really goes away." [Ref. 5] 
4. ILS Planning 
a. Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) 
The ILSP is the principal logistics document for an acquisition program. It 
describes the overall ILS program and includes all ILS program requirements, tasks, and 
milestones for the current acquisition phase. It also projects ILS program planning for 
succeeding phases. The DSMC ILS Support Guide [Ref. 7] states that the purpose of the 
ILSP is to: 
• Provide a complete plan for support of the deployed system; 
• Provide details of the ILS program and its relationship with overall program 
management; 
• Provide necessary information on ILS aspects necessary for sound decisions on 
further development I production ofthe basic system; and 
• Provide the basis for preparation ofiLS sections of the procurement package, e.g., 
Statement of Work (SOW), Specification, and Source Selection and Evaluation 
Criteria. 
Once it is approved, the ILSP is the implementation plan for all activities 
participating in the acquisition of the system. It is important to note that the initial ILSP must 
be developed during the Concept Exploration and Definition Phase (CED) of the system 
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acquisition in order to facilitate planning by other government agencies and contractors during 
this, and follow-on phases. 
The ILSP consists of three basic sections: (1) General; (2) Plans, Goals and 
Strategy; and (3) ILS Milestones. Department of the Army Pamphlet 700-55, "Instructions for 
Preparing the Integrated Logistics Support Plan" [Ref 9], provides the following basic 
guidance for the preparation of the ILSP in Army programs. 
( 1) General. This section normally consists of four sections. An 
"Introduction" section provides general background information about the system being 
acquired. A "Material System Description" section describes the overall material system, the 
major and secondary items to be incorporated, and a description of all components of the 
complete system as it is planned. A "Program Management" section identifies the ILS 
manager, participating organizations, the ILSMT, the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) review 
team, and the working relationships with other groups. And an "Applicable Documents" 
section identifies documents providing guidance, parameters, performance charact~ristics, and 
other criteria for functions and requirements described in the ILSP. 
(2) Plans, Goals, and Strategy. This section normally consists often sections. 
• Operational and Organizational Plan. This section describes the Operational and 
Organizational (0&0) Plan in terms of mission requirements, operational 
environment, and other LSA input parameters. 
• System Readiness Objective. This section defines proposed System Readiness 
Objectives (SROs) and reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) for both 
peacetime and wartime situations. 
• Acquisition Strategy. This section defines the contractual approaches and 
incentives for LCC, support risks, Manpower and Personnel Integration 
(MANPRINT) requirements, source selection, RAM, elements of support 
acquisition, transportability, and other data. 
24 
• LSA Strategy. (This section may be provided as a separate document because of 
its importance.) This section describes the LSA strategy to be used and identifies 
the LSA tasks and subtasks which will be used. 
• Supportability Test and Evaluation Concepts. This section describes the planned 
supportability test and evaluation (T &E) concept, scope, and objectives, and how 
they will be met during T &E. 
• ILS Element Plans. This section identifies the objectives, concepts, trade-off 
factors, goals, thresholds, special requirements, responsibilities, and validation and 
verification requirements for each ILS element. The manner in which the ILS 
elements are to be progressively specified, designed, tested and I or acquired and 
then integrated with the other elements will also be documented. 
• Support Transition Planning. If contractor support is being considered, this section 
will describe how transition to Government support will be accomplished. 
• Support Resource Funds. This section identifies the support resource funds 
involving ILS related life-cycle funding requirements, by ILS element, program 
function and appropriation category. 
• Post Fielding Assessment. This section includes the plans for analyzing and 
assessing field data feedback related to material support and support system 
performance. The plans address assessment methodology, identifY milestones and 
responsibilities, and describe the strategies for improvements. 
• Post-Production Support. (This section may be provided as a separate document 
because of its importance.) This section documents the resources and 
management actions required to ensure the sustainment of SRO requirements and 
logistic support at all levels following the cessation of the production phase for a 
system. 
(3) ILS Milestone Schedule. The ILS milestone schedule shows specific ILS 
and ILS related program tasks and events. The schedule includes the proposed beginning, 
current schedule, and completion dates of significant actions. The ILS milestone schedule also 
shows the inter-relationship oflogistics tasks and events to the overall program milestones. 
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b. Integrated Support Plan 
The Integrated Support Plan (ISP) sets forth the contractor's plan for 
accomplishing the projected ILS effort. Pertinent portions of the ISP are usually incorporated 
into updates of the government prepared ILSP. According to the DSMC ILS Support Guide 




• Major Tasks 
• Sub-plans (e.g., LSA, training, provisioning) 
• Inter-relationships among logistics elements 
• External Constraints 
• Other Pertinent Factors 
c. Post-Production Support Plan 
The Post-Production Support Plan (PPSP) is the plan that identifies the 
sustainment actions necessary to maintain the system in an effective operational state after the 
contractor delivers the last production system. The PPSP is a joint government I contractor 
effort. The DSMC ILS Support Guide [Ref 7] states that the PPSP should focus on issues 
such as: 
• System and subsystem readiness objectives in the post-production time frame; 
• Organizational structures and responsibilities in the post-production time frame; 
• Modifications to the ILSP to accommodate the needs ofPPS planning; 
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• Resources and management actions required to meet PPS objectives; 
• Assessment of the impact of technological change and obsolescence; 
• Evaluation of alternative PPS strategies to accommodate production phase-out; 
• Consideration of support if the life of the system is extended past the original 
forecast date; 
• Data collection efforts in the early deployment phase to provide the feedback 
necessary to update logistics and support concepts; 
• Potential for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and its impact on the production run; 
and 
• Provisions for the use, disposition and storage of government tools and contractor-
developed factory test equipment, tools and dies. 
d. Deployment Planning 
The Deployment Plan outlines the schedules, procedures and actions necessary 
to successfully deploy a new material system. Planning for deployment begins with the initial 
development of the ILSP and intensifies as the system moves through the various phases of 
the acquisition life-cycle. Figure 2.5 shows the relationship between the deployment activities 
and the major ILS activities. 
5. Logistics Support Analysis 
DoDI 5000.2 defines Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) as "the selective application 
of scientific and engineering efforts undertaken during the acquisition process as part of the 
systems engineering process to assist in: causing support considerations to influence design; 
defining support requirements that are related optimally to design and to each other; acquiring 
the required support; and providing the required support during the operational phase at 
minimum cost." The objective ofLSA is "to ensure that a systematic and comprehensive 
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analysis is conducted on a repetitive basis through all phases of the system life cycle in order 
to satisfy readiness objectives at an affordable cost." [Ref 7] 
a. LSA Task Requirements 
Mll.,-SID-1388-1A, "Logistics Support Analysis," [Ref 1 0] is the controlling 
document for LSA and describes, in detail, the five general task sections, 15 tasks, and 77 
subtasks that encompass the LSA effort. The general time phasing of the LSA tasks is shown 
in Figure 2.6. The DSMC ILS Support Guide [Ref 7] summarizes the five general task 
sections as follows: 
• Task Section 100: Program Planning and Control- The primary purpose of the 
tasks in this section is the management and control of the LSA program. The tasks 
provide for formal program planning and review actions. 
• Task Section 200: Mission and Support System Definition - The tasks contained 
in this section identify the operational role and intended use of the new system and 
establish support resource constraints, readiness objectives, supportability design 
requirements and measures of logistics support. During the early phases of and 
acquisition program these analytical tasks provide the greatest opportunity for the 
government to influence the design of the system for support. 
• Task Section 300: Preparation and Evaluation of Alternatives - The tasks 
contained in this section are highly iterative in nature and are applicable to 
successive phases of the preproduction part of the life cycle as well as to 
production design changes. The tasks are generally performed in sequence. 
Functions are identified, alternatives are developed to satisfy the functions, and 
evaluations and trade-offs are conducted. The process is then repeated at 
increasingly lower levels of the systems's Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) in 
the classic system engineering manner. 
• Task Section 400: Determination of Logistics Support Resource Requirements-
This portion of the LSA defines requirements for the ILS elements. Operational 
and maintenance tasks are analyzed to determine the support resources required. 
As development progresses, increasingly more specific design and operational data 
is used to identify logistics resource requirements to more detailed levels. This 
section includes an early assessment of the impact of the new system on 
operational forces and planning to provide continued support after the system is 
no longer in production. 
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• Task Section 500: Supportability Assessment - The supportability test and 
evaluation program serves three objectives throughout a program's life-cycle: (1) 
develop logistics test and evaluation requirements as inputs to system test and 
evaluation plans~ (2) demonstrate contractual compliance with design 
requirements~ and (3) identify supportability problems requiring corrective action. 
Pre- Design 
LSA TASK SECTIQN~ AND !ASKS Concept CEO DV EMD E!&D[O&S Cbanges 
Task 100: 
E!BQGBAM E!l AHHIHG AHD CQHIBQL 
Early LSA Strategy (101) X X X 
LSA Plan (102) X X X X X 
Program & Design Reviews (103) X X X X X 
Task200: 
MISSION AND ~!.!PPQRT SYSTEM 
DEFINITION 
Use Study {201) X X X X 
System Standardization (202) X X X X Comparative Analysis (203) X X X X Technological Opportunities (204) X X 
Support~~ility Factors (205) X X X X 
Task300: 
PREPARATION AND EVALUATIQN 
QF ALTERNATIVES 
Functional Requirements ldent. (301) X X X X Support System Alternatives (302) X X X Evaluation of Alterations & 
Tradeoffs (303) X X X X 
Task 400: 
DETERMINATION OF LOGISTIC 
SUPPORT RESOURCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
Task Analysis (401) X X X 
Early Fieldin!iJ Analysis (402) X X 
Post-Production Support (403) X X X 
Task500: 
SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Supportability Assessment (Test, Evaluation and 
X X Verification) (501) X X 
Figure 2.6. Acquisition Phase Timing ofLSA Tasks From [Ref 7] 
b. LSA Tailoring 
The key to an effective LSA program lies in the selective tailoring of LSA 
subtasks. The goal of this tailoring is to concentrate available resources on the areas that will 
most benefit the program. 
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The LSA effort can be tailored in several different ways. Figure 2. 7 portrays 
a general tailoring logic tree which should be followed in selecting LSA tasks. MIL-STD-
1388-lA [Ref 10] states that the initial selection of tasks and subtasks can be adjusted for the 
following considerations: 
• The amount of design freedom. 
• Time phasing adjustments if program is "fast track." 
• Work already done. 
• Data availability and relevancy. 
• Time and resource availability. 
• Policy directive information needs. 
• Desired tasks not in the standard. 
• Procurement considerations. 
After the initial selection of subtasks is completed, the effort is further focused by 
concentrating effort in high leverage areas. 
6. ILS Summary 
·Figure 2.8 summarizes the relationships among ll..S requirements, LSA tasks, 
the ILSP, and the acquisition life-cycle phases. 
C. NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM ACQUISITION 
1. History I Background 
Nondevelopmental Item (NDI) acquisition has been part of the systems acquisition 
process for the past 25 years. In the past ten years, however, it has received greater emphasis. 
In June of 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the 
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Packard Commission) released its final report on defense acquisition. Among other things, 
this report emphasized a greater use of components, systems, and services available "off-the-
shelf" The report also said that DoD should only develop new or custom made items when 
it has been clearly established that "readily available items" are unable to meet military 
requirements. 
Following in the footsteps ofthe Packard Commission's findings, the NDI Preference 
Act of 1987 was passed. This Act required the DoD to state requirements in terms of 
functions to be performed, performance required, and essential physical characteristics. The 
Act also required that a preference for NDis be established in defense acquisitions. 
In June of 1989, the National Security Review 11 on Defense Management 
acknowledged the findings of previous studies and recommended actions to increase the use 
of NDis in meeting DoD requirements. This was the final review prior to the revision of 
DoDD 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition" [Ref 11] and DoD I 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition 
Management Policies and Procedures" [Ref 8] in 1991. 
In February of 1991, DoDD 5000.1 and DoD I 5000.2 were released with specific 
guidance on the use of NDis in Defense acquisitions. DoDD 5000.1 requires DoD 
components to make "maximum practical use of off-the-shelf commercial products." In 
addition, DoDI 5000.2 states that material requirements shall be satisfied to the maximum 
extent practicable through the use ofNDis when such products will meet the user's need and 
are cost effective over the entire life cycle. 
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2. NDI Defined 
In the fiscal year (FY) 1987 Defense Authorization Act, under the heading of 
"Preference for NDis," Congress defined NDI as: (1) any item available in the commercial 
marketplace; (2) any previously developed item in use by the U.S. Government or cooperating 
foreign governments, or; (3) any item of supply needing only minor modifications to meet 
DoD requirements. This definition has been modified by each of the military services based 
on how they handle NDI acquisitions. 
The Army breaks its definition ofNDI down into three distinct categories: "(1) off-the 
-shelf or basic NDI -- used in the same environment for which items were designed and no 
development or modification is required; (2) NDI adaptation -- products needing adaptation 
for use in an environment different from that for which they were designed (hardening, 
strengthening and related modifications may be required); and (3) NDI integration --
integrating NDI components and subsystems( ... the resulting product requires research and 
development (R&D) efforts; i.e., testing, systems engineering, etc., to ensure us{(r needs are 
satisfied.)" [Ref 4] 
From the Army's definition of NDI, it is obvious that commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) items and NDis are not synonymous. COTS items are just one category of what 
DOD and the Army call NDis. 
3. Benefits and Challenges of NDI Acquisitions 
NDI acquisitions provide several benefits and challenges to the systems acquisition 
process and user. The four primary benefits ofNDI acquisitions are: 
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• Quick response to operational. needs 
• Elimination or reduction of R&D costs 
• Application of state-of-the-art technology to current requirements 
• Reduction of technical, cost, and schedule risks [Ref 12] 
The primary challenge to NDI acquisitions is the possibility of items developed for 
other than DOD needs not meeting all user requirements. When this occurs, mission 
performance trade-offs may be required to gain the advantages of pursuing NDI alternatives. 
Decisions governing operational requirements trade-offs require user review and approval. 
Additional challenges to NDI acquisitions include: providing logistics support; product 
modifications; and, continued product availability. 
4. The Application of NDI to an Acquisition 
The application of NDI to an acquisition cannot be viewed as an all or nothipg 
proposition. Rather, it must be viewed as a spectrum ofNDI involvement ranging from 
complete involvement to no involvement. Figure 2.9 illustrates this point. In general, as the 
extent to which NDI is used in an acquisition moves from no involvement (Full Development) 
to complete involvement (COTS), the development costs and development time go down. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.9, a predominant use ofNDI is related to the insertion of 
NDI at the subsystem, component, and piece part levels. The opportunity for NDI 





Nondevelopmental Item Spectrum 
Figure 2.9. Nondevelopmental Item Spectrum From [Ref 12] 
5. Basic Concepts in NDI Acquisitions 
Development 
Tune 
The most fundamental NDI concept is that the system must meet the user's 
requirements and function in the user's environment. Furthermore, an NDI solution must 
represent the most cost effective way of meeting the user's requirements. In other words, to 
be a viable option, an NDI solution must meet the user's requirements, and perform at a lower 
LCC than a developmental alternative. 
Another important concept in NDI acquisitions is flexibility in determining operational 
requirements. Flexibility should be pursued by both the user and the developer through 
communication and coordination. The developer must be responsive to legitimate needs but 
be conscious of technical risks and affordability constraints. The user must be realistic in 
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stating needs and considering trade-offs. The user must determine whether trade-offs between 
proven capability and rapid deployment out weigh possible performance limitations. If 
performance trade-offs are made, they must be formally changed in operational requirements 
documents. [Ref 12] 
The final basic concept ofNDI deals with tailoring the systems acquisition process to 
the current acquisition. NDI acquisitions are managed within the overall system acquisition 
process used for developmental items. With NDI, however, some of the steps, procedures, 
and requirements associated with the acquisition process may not be necessary. It is 
imperative that the standard process elements be analyzed to determine their applicability to 
the NDI acquisition at hand. This tailoring of the process is essential in gaining the time and 
money saving benefits of an NDI acquisition. 
6. NDI Summary 
The ultimate goal for NDI acquisitions is the same as for all DOD acquisitions; that 
is, to provide reliable, supportable systems to the operational force in a timely manner and at 
a reasonable cost. NDI acquisitions can achieve this goal with the potential advantage of 
reducing time and cost. Additionally, Congress has legislated the increased use ofNDis in all 
acquisition programs. The effective evaluation and application of a viable NDI solution can 
maximize the return to the user, the developing agency, and the taxpayer. 
D. ILS INNDI 
1. ILS Challenges in NDI Acquisitions 
Effective ILS planning and implementation pose a challenge in developmental 
programs, even with all of the training and guidance that acquisition personnel receive. 
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Ensuring that ILS is handled effectively in NDI acquisitions can be a significantly more 
difficult challenge to acquisition personnel because of the differences in the NDI acquisition 
process. First and foremost among those differences is the compressed acquisition life cycle. 
The compressed acquisition life cycle effectively reduces the amount of time available 
for planing and developing organic logistics support. ILS activities that normally take place 
during the demonstration and validation (DEMV AL) and the engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) phases of the life cycle must be accelerated to ensure that effective 
support is developed or procured for the system. Additionally, logistics support may be 
adversely impacted by rapidly evolving NDI hardware and software since DoD may not be 
acquiring sufficient technical data and technical-data rights to maintain configuration control 
of commercial items. [Ref 4] 
Acquisition personnel must be sensitive to these, and other, challenges and ensure that 
they are addressed early in the acquisition process. They must understand that implementing 
effective ILS for NDis will probably require a departure from the "normal" procedures of a 
developmental item acquisition. 
2. ILS Considerations in NDI Acquisition 
a. Market Analysis 
In determining the validity of an NDI acquisition, the system or components 
under consideration must be assessed on the basis of performance and life-cycle cost 
effectiveness. This assessment is called market analysis. The effective implementation ofNDI 
acquisitions is dependant upon a thorough market analysis. It requires the developing agency 
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and the user to investigate potential viable sources to meet the user's requirements at a "more 
reasonable" price, even if performance trade-offs are required. 
It is during the market analysis for a given program that the developing agency 
must provide logistics support information to industry. This information should include items 
such as: planned maintenance echelons; maintainer proficiency levels; software maintenance 
plans; limitations on evacuation of reparables; maintenance environment; supply support; 
training needs; and, technical data needs. [Ref. 4] 
In its response to this Government information, industry should respond with 
information on: system or component reliability history; maintainability features; flexibility for 
government maintenance; critical interfaces with other sub-systems affecting supportability; 
maintenance in various environments I conditions; extent of competition for support; 
warranties; current military and commercial customers; estimated life-cycle costs; and, 
requirements I source oflogistics related training. [Ref. 4] It is this information that allows the 
developing agency to form an initial estimate of a system or components ability to meet the 
user's requirements in terms ofiLS. 
b. Formulating the ILSP 
Based on the logistics support knowledge gained during the market analysis, 
a tailored ILSP must be prepared to provide a complete plan for the ILS of the system. 
Thoroughness in preparation of the ILSP is critical in an NDI acquisition because of the 
compressed time schedule. In a survey conducted by the DSMC 1991-92 Military Research 
Fellows [Ref. 4], one respondent said: 
It takes me 18 - 20 months to do a user and market survey and put on contract 
a piece of commercial equipment. From contract award, the vendor can 
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usually deliver equipment within 3 - 6 months; it takes nearly 30 months to do 
all the logistics required for fielding. Logistics is, by far, the 'long pole in the 
tent.' TMs (Technical Manuals) and MAC (Maintenance Allocation Charts) 
are the longest, along with parts provisioning and stocking." 
Decisions on how the NDI will be supported must be considered during trade-
off analysis. It is important to realize that there may not be an "ideal" solution to ILS in an 
NDI acquisition. As long as all legitimate concerns are recognized, and the ILSP is structured 
to optimize the risk that they present, effective ILS can be achieve for the life of the NDI. 
[Ref 4] 
c. Contractor vs Organic Support 
One of the primary areas of concern while developing the ILSP for an NDI is 
to what extent contractors will be involved in the support of the system after it is deployed. 
Due to the shortened development times a,ssociated with NDI acquisitions, there may be .little 
or no time to establish an organic support capability initially. Interim contractor support during 
initial deployment is one method that the developing agency can deal with this shortfall. It 
allows a system to be deployed and operational while organic support capability is being 
established. 
Figure 2.10 can be used as a guide in developing a logistics support strategy. 
It is important to note, however, that a decision to rely on lifecycle contractor support (LCCS) 
must be agreed upon by users and supporting activities and it must be accompanied by 
adequate planning. [Ref 12] 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense publication SD-2, "Buying 
NDI," [Ref 12] provides the following narrative explanation ofFigure 2.10. 
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There are five use factors: How the NDI will be used from "as is" to fully 
militarized modification~ where the NDI will be used, i.e., in what 
environment, form a fixed I industrial I nonhostile one to a mobile I austere I 
hostile one~ how long the NDI system will be used, i.e., the system's projected 
service life~ when the NDI is to be used, i.e., to be deployed immediately or 
sometime in the future~ and, why an NDI is being selected, to take advantage 
of an advancing technology (with changing configurations) or the availability 
of a proven, stable design. Each use factor shows a range of support methods. 
is 
Contractor vs. Organic Support 
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Figure 2.10. Contractor vs Organic Support From [Ref. 12] 
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These methods range from no support, which implies disposal upon failure to 
full organic support, and includes full contractor support and combined 
contractor I organic support. The proposed NDI and its system use factors 
may serve as a guide in planning the logistic support strategy. 
d. LSA Tailoring 
As mentioned before, the key to an effective LSA program lies in the selective 
tailoring ofLSA subtasks. The goal of this tailoring is to concentrate available resources on 
the areas that will most benefit the program. This is especially important in NDI acquisitions. 
Figure 2.11 and 2.12 contain examples of how to tailor LSA requirements to NDI acquisitions. 
e. Configuration Management and Control 
Configuration management and configuration control must be carefully 
evaluated when considering NDI alternatives. The ability of the user to adjust to possible 
configuration changes which are beyond their control is an important consideration for NDI 
acquisitions since other buyers, commercial or military, may drive changes to an item which 
affect the user's ability to support the item. This real possibility requires careful consideration 
when conducting trade-off decisions. [Ref. 12] 
Furthermore, the developing agency is often relegated to limited configuration 
control with NDis due to the commercial or multiple use nature of such items. This limited 
configuration control should influence the technical data requirements that the developing 
agency places on the contractor. For example, with limited configuration control, form, fit, 
and function data is preferred to full design engineering data since the latter is more expensive 
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Figure 2.12. NDI LSA Tailoring (Navy Version) From [Ref 4] 
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3. NDI Considerations for the Ten ILS Elements 
a. Maintenance Planning 
The primary challenge with respect to maintenance planning for NDI 
acquisitions is how, or to what extent, to use existing commercial or other maintenance and 
support systems. SD-2 [Ref. 12] lists the following items as factors that will influence the 
decision: 
• The degree to which manufacturers, other military services, or other sources 
already provide maintenance support to existing customers; 
• Responsiveness of such support activity to meet military requirements in peacetime 
and wartime (mean logistic down time, need for priority service, wartime surge, 
etc.); 
• The degree to which the Service will be able to provide organic maintenance 
support, and the need for support facilities or a training and rotational base for 
service technical personnel; and, 
• A need to minimize "down time." 
NDI acquisitions give the developing agency the potential of using existing 
commercial or other service maintenance facilities to replace or supplement existing organic 
maintenance facilities. This effectively reduces life-cycle costs, personnel, training, and 
documentation requirements. 
The developing agency and the user may determine that LCCS is the preferable 
method of support for the NDI system. If the contractor is willing and able to support their 
product with preventive maintenance, repair parts, and technical personnel through the item's 
expected service life, an acceptable support strategy must be selected. SD-2 [Ref. 12] lists 
the following as possible support strategies under the LCCS scenario: 
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• Return to factory for repairs 
• Provision test equipment, procedures and parts for intermediate or depot-level 
repair 
• Provision test equipment, procedures, and parts for user repair 
• On-site repair by contractor personnel 
• A combination of the above 
b. Manpower and Personnel 
The ILS element of Manpower and Personnel is concerned with the number 
and skill levels of people required to operate and maintain and item. SD-2 [Ref 12] provides 
the following specific areas that influence NDI Manpower and Personnel decisions: 
• Number and type of people required for operation 
• Number and type of people required for maintenance 
• New skills, knowledge or grades required 
NDis limit Manpower and Personnel activities because the acquisition is for a defined end-
product. This means that, with limited exception, the design cannot be influenced to account 
for Manpower and Personnel constraints. 
If the acquisition is for a COTS item, Manpower and Personnel analysis must 
determine whether the item, in its "off-the-shelf' configuration, meets Manpower and 
Personnel criteria for the requirement. If it does not, this will lead to a reevaluation of the 
basic NDI decision and I or modification of the initial support concept. If the acquisition is 
for a modified NDI, then negative findings during the Manpower and Personnel analysis may 
be compensated for by simple design modifications. [Ref 12] 
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A thorough Manpower and Personnel analysis is absolutely critical during NDI 
acquisitions. "The results of ... the analysis could dictate modification of commercial 
equipment, affect source selection, drive contractor logistics support, or eliminate NDI as a 
solution." [Ref 12] 
c. Supply Support 
NDI acquisitions may provide the developing agency with a well established 
pool of usage data from the manufacturer and other users. This data can aid in the accurate 
prediction of initial provisioning requirements for repair parts and related support equipment 
as well as in estimating follow-on provisioning needs. However, the unique characteristics of 
NDI acquisitions add two areas of concern in Supply Support. 
First, many commercial items are manufactured using a modular construction 
technique. This technique inherently requires unique repair parts. SD-2 [Ref 12] states that 
where this impact is "great," alternative supply methods should be investigated and employed 
where cost-effective. 
Second, is the concern over limited configuration control. The question here 
is how to provide supply support for items which may change from one procurement to the 
next. This obviously has a detrimental affect on the logistics system. Theoretically, each time 
a new or different item is brought into the inventory, new manuals, drawings and parts will 
have to be procured, while simultaneously supporting the existing equipment. 
Both of these concerns must be thoroughly analyzed during the Supply Support 
analysis. Findings must be addressed in the ILSP. 
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d. Support Equipment 
Support equipment requirements must be identified as early as possible. 
Normally, military standard test equipment is preferred to new or unique equipment. This may 
not be feasible with NDis however. Regardless of the type of support equipment utilized, 
calibration standards and procedures will also need to be reviewed for the equipment. 
e. Technical Data 
ILS related technical data includes items such as specifications, drawings, 
technical manuals, calibration procedures and other data required to manufacture, test, inspect, 
perform preventive and corrective maintenance, operate, and repair the item or its parts. As 
with any type of acquisition, the technical data must complement the maintenance and supply 
support plans. What is imperative in NDI acquisitions is that problems concerning availability, 
maintenance, storage, and distribution must be resolved before the actual acquisition of the 
item in order to identify what technical data is actually needed for successful support of the 
program. 
f. Training and Training Support 
· Operator and maintenance training requirements for NDI systems must be 
determined on an expedited basis. Additionally, contractor assistance may be required for 
initial new equipment training (NET) and establishment of the institutional training base. 
These requirements are determined by the developing agency in close coordination with the 
user. 
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g. Computer Resources Support 
This ILS element includes the facilities, hardware, software, documentation, 
manpower, and personnel need to operate and support embedded computer systems. SD-2 
[Ref. 12] states that the computer resources area is "NDI intensive." "Careful front-end 
investigation of all support, mission, interoperability, and market issues, while complying with 
applicable computer resource policies, will ensure an appropriate NDI acquisition." [Ref. 12] 
h. Facilities 
Facility requirement evaluation is important for NDI systems as well as 
developmental systems. However, two factors in NDI systems increase the demands for 
facility planning. These are (1) a compressed schedule; and (2) a non-DOD design. "It is 
important that early logistics considerations include defining the types of facilities, facility 
improvements, locations, space, and environmental requirements necessary to support the 
NDI." [Ref. 12] 
i. Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation 
Requirements for packaging, handling, storage, and transportation of an item 
must be included in the solicitation. Commercial standards can be used to the extent that they 
satisfy military requirements. However, if any modifications are required, they must be 
identified early and included in the solicitation. The key here is to avoid the high cost of 
postproduction modifications. 
j. Design Interface 
"During all life-cycle phases and as part of the Market Analysis, the design 
characteristics are evaluated in terms of supportability issues, costs, and compatibility with 
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support equipment. These characteristics are included in source selection criteria, thus serving 
the intent of design influence and interface." [Ref. 12] 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
One of the toughest challenges in the acquisition process is ensuring effective ILS. 
This challenge is especially prevalent in NDI acquisitions. This chapter provided a brief 
overview of the ILS process in defense system acquisitions and the basic concepts behind NDI 
acquisitions. It also took the integration of these two topics and looked at some of the 
challenges and considerations ofiLS in NDI programs. 
Some of those challenges and considerations facing the developing agency in the 
development of an effective NDI ILS plan are: the compressed acquisition life-cycle; the 
rapidly evolving nature ofNDI hardware and software; the inability of the developing agency 
to influence the system design; and the debate over contractor versus organic support. 
This all boils down to one thing: there may not be an "ideal" or "text book" solution 
to support for NDis. Acquisition personnel must understand that impl~menting effective ILS 
for NDI will probably require a departure from the "normal" procedures of a developmental 
item acquisition. As long as the unique requirements and concerns of each NDI program are 
recognized and considered, effective ILS can be achieved for the life of an NDI. 
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ill. CASE DESCRIPTION: INTEGRA TED LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
IN THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Special Operations Aircraft (SOA) Program was initiated by Headquarters, 
Department of the Army (DA) message, DAMO-WSA, 301345Z April1986, in response to 
the Department of Defense (DoD) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Airlift Report and the 
SOF Expedited Essential Required Operational Capability (ROC). [Ref 19] In accordance 
with Army Regulation (AR) 70-1, "Army Acquisition Policy" [Ref 2], the SOA Program was 
designated an Acquisition Category (ACAT) II, Type III Non-Developmental Item (NDI) 
Program. [Ref 13] 
In July 1987 the Product Manager (PM) for SOA was officially designated a Product 
Management Office (PMO) under the Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation. The 
mission of the PMO was to "contract, develop and qualify" modifications to the UH-60L 
(Blackhawk) and the CH-47D (Chinook) to meet the ROC of the MH-60K and MH-47E. 
These aircraft are unique in comparison to the standard Army aircraft fleet. They include 
advanced systems such as: air-to-air refuel probes; larger fuel tanks; integrated avionics 
subsystems (lAS); multi-mode radar (MMR); upgraded engines; aircraft survivability 
equipment (ASE); forward-looking infrared (FLIR); and integrated mission, communication, 
and navigation systems. 
This chapter is comprised of two main sections. The first major section describes the 
peculiarities of the MH-60K and MH-47E. It includes a brief overview of the mission need, 
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the operational requirement, and a detailed description of the system(s). The second major 
section describes the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) for these unique aircraft. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides the reader with an 
understanding of the complexity of the systems involved in the SOA Program and the 
environment in which they must operate. And secondly, it provides the reader with an 
understanding of the depth and thoroughness of the ILS planning in the SOA Program. This 
chapter sets the ground work for an analysis of the adequacy of the ILS planning conducted 
for these complex aircraft. 
B. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS Am CRAFT 
1. The Mission 
The SOA Program provided 23 MH-60K and 26 MH-47E helicopters to the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The aircraft are assigned to the Army's 
I 60th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) (Airborne)( A) in support of their special 
operations aviation mission. 
The primary mission ofthe I 60th SOAR( A) is the long range insertion, extraction, and 
resupply of Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF personnel and equipment. These SOF personnel 
are used in counter-terrorism actions, strategic intelligence strikes, tactical reconnaissance, 
infiltration, resupply, and night and day interdiction operations during periods of adverse 
weather and/or limited visibility conditions. Other missions include light-infantry operations 
in support of special operations, contingencies, and civil affairs and psychological operations. 
[Ref 14] 
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2. The Mission Need 
The SOA program was initiated to fulfill the operational requirement of a "US Army 
aircraft ... capable of performing clandestine, deep penetration airlift missions in adverse 
weather with limited lighting and visibility during night or day conditions over all types of 
terrain." This validated requirement was based on the perceived limited ability of the UH-60L 
and CH-47D helicopters to perform special operations missions. The limitations of these 
aircraft were grouped into three broad categories: (1) performance characteristics; (2) 
vulnerability to threat weapon systems; and (3) limited self-deployability. [Ref. 1] 
3. The Required Operational Capability 
The required operational capability of the SOA was split into two requirements. One 
for a multi-mission utility helicopter, the MH-60K, and one for a multi-mission medium lift 
helicopter, the MH-4 7E. 
a. MH-60K Operational Requirements 
The requirements for a multi-mission utility helicopter were defined in the SOP 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD required the aircraft to have an 
unrefueled mission radius of200 nautical miles (NM) while carrying a four man flight crew, 
mission equipment package, ASE, suppressive weapons, and combat troops. At the midpoint 
of the mission, the aircraft must be able to hover Out-Of-Ground-Effect (OGE) at 2000 feet 
mean sea level (MSL), at 70 degrees Fahrenheit (F) while carrying 12 fully equipped 
personnel. (See Table 3 .1.) [Ref. 15] 
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MH-60K REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
Onerational Characteristics Reguirement 
Combat Mission Radius 200NM 
Payload at 2000 ft I 70 degrees F, midpoint hover 12 passengers 
Payload at 4000 ft I 95 degrees F, midpoint hover 7 passengers 
Unrefueled self-deploy range 755NM 
Air-to-Air refueling Yes 
Night Vision Goggle compatibility Yes 
Shipboard operations compatibility Yes 
Secure, jam resistant communications Yes 
Navigation Accuracy GPS equivalent 
0 0 Table 3.1. MH-60K Reqmred Operational Capab1hty From [Ref 15] 
b. MH-47E Operational Requirements 
The requirements for a multimission medium lift helicopter were defined in the 
SOF Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD required the aircraft to have 
an unrefueled mission radius of 300 NM while carrying a four man flight crew, mission 
equipment package, ASE, suppressive weapons, and combat troops. At the midpoint of the 
mission, the aircraft must be able to hover OGE at 2000 feet MSL, at 70 degrees F while 
carrying 36 fully equipped personnel. (See Table 3.2) [Ref 14] 
4. The Mission Equipment Package 
In order to overcome the limitations in operational capability that define the "mission 
need", the SOA Program began the design, integration, modification and qualification of a 
Mission Equipment Package (MEP) to enhance the operational capability of the UH-60L and 
CH-47D. The MEP included (1) an Integrated Avionics Subsystem (lAS) to enhance the 
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MH-47E REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
Ouerational Characteristics Reguirement 
Combat Mission Radius 300NM 
Payload at 2000 ft I 70 degrees F, midpoint hover 36 passengers 
Payload at 4000 ft /95 degrees F, midpoint hover 30 passengers 
Unrefueled self-deploy range 1260NM 
Air-to-Air refueling Yes 
Night Vision Goggle compatibility Yes 
Shipboard operations compatibility Yes 
Secure, jam resistant communications Yes 
Navigation Accuracy GPS equivalent 
Table 3.2. MH-47E Required Operational Capability From [Ref. 14) 
communications and navigation capability of the aircraft; (2) an improved Aircraft 
Survivability Equipment suite; (3) more powerful armament; ( 4) the addition of external and 
internal fuel tanks and air-to-air refueling provisions; (5) upgraded transmissions (MH-60K 
only); and (6) upgraded engines (MH-47E only). The following paragraphs provide a brief 
description of the myriad of complex systems that were integrated into the aircraft as part of 
the MEP in order to bring the capability of the UH-60L and CH-4 7D up to the stated 
operational requirements. 
a. Integrated Avionics System (lAS) 
By far the most complex system and the most challenging to integrate into the 
aircraft was the lAS. The lAS is the heart and soul of the SOA and is the system that most 
differentiates the MH-60K and MH-47E from their brethren the UH-60L and CH-47D. The 
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following components and systems comprise the lAS. (See Figure 3.1 and Appendix B for 
system interfaces.) 
(1) Cockpit Management System (CMS). The CMS is the primary 
interface between the flight crew, aircraft systems, and the lAS subsystems. It provides 
control and display of flight data and systems operation for communication, identification, 
navigation, flight direction and guidance, mission aids, and ASE. The system also provides 
control and display of aircraft systems, component status, self-test capability, caution, warning, 
and advisory alerts, and zeroizing of mission data. [Ref. 16] 
The CMS is a redundant system which incorporates traditional flight 
instruments and system indicators into an electronic ("glass") cockpit. System performance 
is displayed on a by exception basis. Dual components and data buses ensure that system 
operation will not be compromised by a single failure. The CMS is comprised of the following 
components. [Ref. 16] 
Four Multifunction Displays (MFD), two in each pilot instrument 
panel, provide display of flight symbology data, sensor video, communications I navigation, 
aircraft system status, etc. (See Figure 3.1) [Ref. 16] 
Two Control Display Units (CDU), one on each side ofthe center 
console, provide the primary data input source for the CMS and replace conventional control 
panels for systems management. (See Figure 3.2) [Ref. 16] 
Two fully redundant Mission Processors (MP), located in the avionics 
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,..... ________________________________________ _ 
Two Display Processors (DP), located in the avionics compartment, 
provide display symbology in response to commands from the MPs based on MFD key 
depressions and screen control in response to commands from the MFDs. [Ref 16] 
Two Military Standard (MIL-STD) 1553B dual standby redundant 
multiplex data buses provide the interface between the CMS components and the 1553B bus-
compatible helicopter systems. [Ref 16] 
(2) Communications I Identification System. The communications I 
identification system integrates numerous pieces of military communications equipment, 
communications security equipment, and identification friend or foe (IFF) equipment into a 
"user friendly" system controllable through a single CDU instead of through 15 separate 
control heads. The following components comprise the communications I identification 
system (See figure 3.1 and Appendix B for basic interfaces.) [Ref. 16] 
Communications Control Unit C11746CV)31ARC. The C11746 
provides intercommunications between crewmembers and control of navigation and 
communication radios through the RTU interface with the CMS. [Ref 15] 
VHF-FM Radio ARC-186(V). The ARC-186 provides two-way FM 
communications of voice and data in the 30.000 to 87.975 MHZ frequency range, and AM 
voice and data reception from 108.000 to 115.975 MHZ frequency range. [Ref. 15] 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), 
ANIARC-201A(V). The ARC-201 provides two-way FM communication of voice and data 
in the 30.00 to 79.75 MHZ frequency range. [Ref. 15] 
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FM Amplifier AM-7189A/ARC. The AM-7189 provides amplified 
output to the ARC-201. [Ref. 15] 
UHF-AM (HA VEOUICK ll) Radio AN/ARC-164(V). The ARC-164 
provides two-way AM communications of voice and data in the 225.000 to 399.975 MHZ 
frequency range. [Ref. 15] 
HF Radio. AN/ ARC-199(V). The ARC-199 provides two-way AM, 
Upper Frequency Sideband (USB), and Lower Frequency Sideband (LSB) communications 
of voice in the 2.000 to 29.999 MHZ frequency range. [Ref. 15] 
SATCOM UHF Radio LST -5C. The LST -5 radio provides two-way 
AM or FM voice communications via satellite, or to ground based stations in the 225.000 to 
399.995 MHZ frequency range. [Ref. 15] 
Voice Security System KY-58/TSEC and Voice Security 
RCU/Processor KY-75/TSEC. Provisions are included for three KY-58s and one KY-75. 
The KY-58 provides secure voice and data communications for the ARC-201, ARC-186, 
ARC-164, and the LST-5C radios. The KY-75 provides secure voice and data 
communications for the ARC-199 radio. [Ref. 15] 
Ground Communications Radio SABER The SABER radio provides 
voice communications over the 136.000 to 168.000 MHZ frequency range. [Ref. 15] 
Airborne TargetHandover System (ATHS) CP-1516/ANS141. The 
A THS provides digital message transmission and reception capability controlled and displayed 
via the CMS. ATHS may be used with the ARC-201, ARC-164, and the LST-5. [Ref 15] 
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Identification Friend or Foe CIFF) Transponder AN/APX-lOOCV). 
The APX-100 receives IFF interrogation at a frequency of 1030 MHZ, originated and 
directionally beamed by a ground or airborne challenging station. The APX-1 00 detects the 
radio interrogation signals, recognizes the discrete pulse spacings, and activates transmission 
at 1090 MHZ of the properly coded reply pulse trains. [Ref 15] 
Transponder Computer KIT -1 C/TSEC. Provisions are included for 
the KIT-1C. The KIT-1C is used for decoding interrogations and encoding transmissions of 
the APX-100. [Ref. 15] 
(3) Integrated Navigation System. The integrated navigation system 
links nine navigation systems together through the 1553B data bus and gives the pilot access 
to all available navigational data through the CD Us and MFDs. The following components 
comprise the integrated navigation system (See Figure 3.1 and Appendix B for basic 
interfaces.) [Ref. 15] 
Inertial Navigation Unit CINU) CN-1656/ ASN-141. The INU provides 
real-time aircraft position and velocities. [Ref. 15] 
Attitude and Heading Reference System CAHRS) AN/ASN-145. The 
AHRS provides accurate outputs of pitch, roll, and heading information. It receives data of 
the earth's magnetic field from the ML-1 magnetic heading sensor (flux valve). [Ref. 15] 
Global Position System CGPS). AN/ASN-149(V)2. The GPS provides 
three dimensional position determination, velocity, and time information to the MPs. The 
GPS is integrated with the INU and the Doppler navigation systems. [Ref. 15] 
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Dop_plerNavigation System AN/ASN-137. The doppler navigation 
system is a secondary aiding sensor which provides highly accurate body frame velocities to 
the MPs. The MPs send doppler velocity information to the GPS, INU, and AHRS. [Ref 15] 
Automatic Direction Finder Set CADF) AN/ARN-149CV)2. The ADF 
operates within the frequency range of 100 to 299.5 KHZ. It is a navigational radio aid which 
provides a visual indication of the aircraft's relative bearing to low and medium frequency 
Non-Directional Beacons (NDBs) or standard broadcast stations. [Ref 15] 
VOR!ILS AN/ ARN-123CV). The VOR!ILS receives automatic VHF 
Omnidirectional Radio (VOR) bearing; marker beacon (MB) position; localizer (LOC) and 
Glideslope (GS) information for en route and terminal navigation; and Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) approaches and landings. The VORIILS receiver section processes VOR and 
LOC signals over the frequency range of 108.00 to 117.95 MHZ. The 40 channel GS 
receiver section processes GS signals over the frequency range of 329.15 to 335.00 MHZ. 
The MB receiver processes 75 MHZ MB signals. [Ref 15] 
TACAN AN/ARN-118(V). The TACAN is a short range 
omnibearing, distance measuring navigation system that provides continuous indication of the 
bearing and distance of the aircraft to any TACAN surface beacon within a line-of-sight 
distance of 390 nautical miles. In addition, this system may be used to determine the line-of-
sight distance to another aircraft equipped with similar T ACAN equipment. [Ref 15] 
Personnel Locator System (PLS) AN/ARS-6(V)3. The PLS provides 
the relative position of downed aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-90 or AN/PRC-112A(V) 
survival transponder radio. [Ref 15] 
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Radar Beacon Transponder AN/ APX-105. The APX-1 05 is included 
to provide assistance with refueling tankers. Adequate encoding provisions are incorporated 
to enable aircrews, in interrogating support aircraft, to readily identify beacon modes. [Ref 
15] 
Radar Altimeter AN/APN-209(V). The radar altimeter provides an 
accurate indication of the absolute altitude of an aircraft over all types of terrain surfaces. [Ref 
15] 
( 4) Mission Aids. The mission aids portion of the lAS includes a 
conglomeration of systems which aid the pilot in the successful completion ofvarious special 
operations missions. The mission aids suite is comprised of the following systems (See figure 
3.1 and Appendix B for basic interfaces.) [Ref. 15] 
Multimode Radar (MMR). ANI AP0-174A. The MMR is an airborne 
forward-looking radar with Terrain Following (TF) and Terrain Avoidance (TA) as the 
primary modes of operation to enable night and all-weather operational flights. [Ref. 15] 
Map Display Generator (MDG). The MDG generates and displays a 
presentation of aircraft position and other navigational data in a pictorial form superimposed 
over a moving map. [Ref. 15] 
ANVIS Display Symbology System. The ANVIS Display System is 
used in conjunction with the ANVIS night vision goggles. Flight display symbology is 
presented to the pilot and copilot as viewed through the ANVIS goggles. [Ref 15] 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) AN/ AA0-16B. The FLIR is a 
modular night vision sensor capable of being integrated with the cockpit displays to provide 
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the flight crew with long range detection, recognition, and navigation capabilities during total 
darkness. The FUR provides imagery to aid and assist ANVIS equipped pilots during night, 
low level en route, nap-of-the-earth, and terminal area maneuvers, and during search and 
rescue operations. The FUR also provides an independent night pilotage backup capability 
under overcast or moonless skies where ANVIS capabilities are marginal or inadequate. [Ref 
15] 
R2548/ AXO Video Recorder. The video recorder tapes tactical 
information for retention at the conclusion of the mission. The video recorder tapes using 
images provided from the FUR systems visual display. Time and position data is 
superimposed on the tape. [Ref 15] 
Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) EBC-302SHM. The ELT 
transmits a signal to aid in the location of a downed aircrew. The EL T operates on 121.5 at:J.d 
243.0 MHZ. [Ref. 15] 
b. Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) 
The ASE integrated into the SOA is one of the most impressive suites of air-
defense detection and defense equipment every assembled on a single airframe. Although the 
ASE suite is not part of the lAS, it is controlled through systems in the lAS. Figure 3.1 and 
Appendix B show the relationship between the lAS and the ASE suite. As with the 
components of the lAS, the ASE suite is connected to the 1553B data buses and is controlled 
by the pilots through the CD Us. The following components comprise the ASE suite. [Ref 
15] 
66 
( 1) Detection Equipment. 
Pulsed Radar Warning Receiver AN/APR-39A(V)l. The APR-39 
provides warning of radar-directed threats to allow appropriate evasive maneuvers and 
deployment of active countermeasures. It uses a digital processor, alphanumeric display, and 
synthetic voice warning to provide warning of radar-directed air defense threat systems. The 
system has the capability of detecting all pulse radars normally associated with hostile surface-
to-air, airborne intercept, or antiaircraft weapons. [Ref. 15] 
Laser Detection Set AN/A VR-2A. The A VR-2 is a passive laser 
warning system that receives, processes, and displays threat information resulting from aircraft 
illumination by lasers. The threat information is displayed on the APR-39 indicator. [Ref 15] 
Radar Warning System AN/APR-44(V)3. The APR-44 Radar 
Warning System alerts the aircrew to radar threats from surface-to-air missiles and airborne 
intercept missiles. The alert is provided by aural warning through the intercom system and 
visual indicator light. [Ref 15] 
Missile Warning Set CMWS) AN/AAR-47. The MWS is a passive 
missile detector that automatically cues the M-130 Flare I Chaff Dispenser. [Ref. 15] 
(2) Defensive Equipment. 
Pulsed Radar Jammer AN/AL0-136(V)2. The ALQ-136 is an 
automatic radar jammer that analyzes various incoming radar signals. When the signals are 
identified as coming from a threat source, jamming automatically begins, and is continuous 
until the threat radar breaks lock. [Ref. 15] 
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Continuous Wave (CW) Radar Jammer AN/AL0-162(V)2. The 
ALQ-162 provides warning and protection against surface-to-air missiles and airborne 
intercept missiles that use CW radar for guidance. When CW signals detected by the system 
are validated, jamming is initiated and warning is given to the crew. [Ref 15] 
M-130 Flare I ChaffDispenser. The M-130 system dispenses flare 
decoys and chaffbundles. The system can be operated manually, or it can be automatically 
cued by the AAR-47 Missile Detector. [Ref 15] 
(3) Other Equipment. Other equipment included in the ASE suite 
include the Interference Blanker Unit (IBU) CN-1493/A. The IBU is designed to effect 
blanking, look-through, and priority between ASE and other systems to enable maximum 
effectiveness of the AS E. [Ref 15] 
c. Armament 
The aircraft are structurally modified to accept two GE, 7.62mm mini-guns 
capable of firing at a sustained rate of2000 or 4000 rounds per minute. The guns are pintle 
mounted and allow unrestricted fields of fire throughout the required azimuth. [Ref 15] 
d. Fuel Systems 
The SOA are modified and equipped to accommodate a variety of fuel system 
configurations. There are slight differences in the fuel system modifications between the MH-
60K and the MH-4 7E, but the resulting increase in range brings both aircraft up to the 
required operational capability specified. The following subsystems comprise the 
modifications to the SOA fuel systems. 
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( 1) Aerial Refueling Probe. A composite aerial refueling probe is 
attached to the right side of the airframe. This refuel probe gives the SOA the ability to 
conduct air-to-air refueling with a variety of host tanker aircraft. This system effectively gives 
the SOA self-deployability to anywhere in the world. [Ref. 15] 
(2) Internal Auxiliary Fuel Tanks. The MH-60K can be fitted with up 
to four internal auxiliary tanks with a capacity of 172 usable gallons each. The MH-4 7E can 
be fitted with up to four 800 gallon internal auxiliary tanks. [Ref. 14 and 15] 
(3) External Tank Supports (ETS). The MH-60K can be fitted with 
ETS structures in order to carry one 230 gallon composite tank externally on each side of the 
aircraft. [Ref. 15] 
(4) Long-Range Fuel Tanks. The MH-47E is modified to carry fuel 
in two 1000 gallon pods, one on each side of the fuselage. This standard fuel load essentially 
doubles the total capacity of the CH-47D. [Ref. 14] 
e. Transmissions 
The MH-60K is equipped with an "improved durability" gear box (main 
transmission) developed for the Navy. [Ref. 15] 
f. Engines 
The MH-47E i~ equipped with a Lycoming T55-L-714 high performance 
turbine engine. The engine improves performance in hot weather and high altitude through 
the use of a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (F ADEC). [Ref. 14] 
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g. Other Systems 
The SOA are equipped with various other systems which facilitate the 
accomplishment of specific SOF missions. The following systems constitute the remainder 
oftheMEP. 
( 1) Rescue Hoist. A hydraulically powered and electrically controlled 
rescue hoist is fitted externally above the main cabin door. The rescue hoist is capable of 
raising 600 pounds at controlled speeds of up to 100 feet per minute with 245 feet of usable 
cable. [Ref 14] 
(2) Rotor Brake. The SOA are equipped with a manually operated, 
hydraulically actuated rotor brake which can be used to hold the rotors stationary while starting 
the first engine and to stop the rotors during engine shut down. The rotor brake is a critical 
component for shipboard operations. [Ref 14] 
(3) Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System (FRIES). The SOA are 
structurally modified to accept FRIES hardware. Attachment of the Government furnished 
hardware makes the SOA, FRIES mission capable. [Ref 14] 
h. Software 
Although the software that integrates the various subsystems into a usable 
system is not a "component" of the MEP, I would be remiss in not mentioning it here as an 
integral part of the program. Over 380,000 source lines of code went into the integration of 
the lAS and ASE subsystems. It is through this integrating software that the SOA are actually 
able to perform to their required operation capability. [Ref. 17] 
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C. THE SOA INTEGRA TED LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN 
It should be obvious from the system description above that the MH-60K and MH-
47E are among the most complex aircraft in the world today. Even with this complexity, 
however, the SOA Program was designated an NDI program. As such, the entire program 
was under an accelerated time line for completion and fielding. With these constraints, it was 
especially important for the acquisition logisticians to be involved early in the acquisition 
process in order to influence the program in terms of ILS. 
The ILSP is the principle logistics document for an acquisition program. It describes 
the overall ILS program and provides a complete plan, for support of the deployed system. 
The quality and thoroughness of the ILSP is usually a good indicator of the quality and 
thoroughness of the ILS effort. The following sections describe the ILSP of the SOA 
Program. 
1. SOA ILSP Overview 
The SOA Program had a separate ILSP for the MH-60K and the MH-47E. In 
general, these documents were identical and will be considered one and the same for the 
purposes of describing the SOA Program's ILSP. Where significant differences were noted, 
they will be highlighted accordingly. 
The SOA Program's ILSP followed the format directed by D~partment of the Army 
(DA) Pamphlet 700-55, "Instructions for Preparing the Integrated Logistics Support Plan." 
[Ref 9] Section I, entitled "General", consisted ofbackground and general information. This 
information included, but was not limited to, the purpose of the program, the program 
background, and a description of the system. (See Chapter II, Section B.4.a.(l) of this thesis 
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for a more complete description of the contents of Section I.) The information contained in 
Section I of the SOA Il..SP has already been covered in Section B of this chapter and will not 
be discussed further. 
Section II, entitled "Plans, Goals, and Strategy, consisted of eight subsections: (1) 
Operational and Organizational Plans; (2) System Readiness Objectives; (3) Acquisition 
Strategy; (4) Logistics Support Analysis Strategy; (5) Supportability Test and Evaluation 
Concept; (6) ILS Element Plans; (7) Support Resource Funds; and (8) Post-Fielding 
Assessments. This Section will be discussed in more detail below. 
Section ill, entitled "ILS Milestone Schedule", consisted of several milestone charts 
and calendars. See Appendix C for the details of those schedules. Other than the inclusion 
of the actual schedules in Appendix C, Section III will not be discussed further. 
was: 
2. SOA ILSP Section II: Plans, Goals, and Strategy 
a. Subsection 1: Operational and Organizational Plan 
The Operational and Organizational (0&0) Plan, as defined by the SOA ILSP, 
The SOA will be primarily used for long range insertion, extraction and 
resupply of Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
personnel. The aircraft will provide a means for rapid deployment of forces 
and equipment into combat for counter-terrorism actions, strategic intelligence 
strikes, tactical reconnaissance, and infiltration and interaction at night, during 
periods of adverse weather and during reduced visibility conditions. Other 
operational missions will be light infantry operations in support of special 
operations, contingencies, and civil affairs and psychological operations. [Ref 
18] 
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b. Subsection 2: System Readiness Objectives 
The SOA Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) objectives were 
based on the following five criteria: (1) Mean Time Between Essential Maintenance Actions 
(MTBEMA); (2) Mean Time Between Mission Abort (MTBMA); (3) Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) at the Aviation Unit Maintenance (A VUM) level; (4) Operational Availability (Ao) 
based on a Fully Mission Capable (FMC) status and a Mission Capable (MC) status; and, ( 5) 
Direct Maintenance Man-hours per Flight Hour (DMMH/FH) based on total A VUM and 
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) level work. [Ref. 18] 
Table 3.3 depicts the system readiness objectives identified in the SOA ILSP. A 1200 
flight hour (FH) Reliability Validation (utilizing production aircraft) was scheduled to assess 
the degree to which these objectives were actually met. 
SYSTEM READINESS OBJECTIVES 
Criteria MH-60K MH-47E 
MTBEMA 3.0 hours 3.0 hours 
MTBMA 52 hours (for 5.5 hour mission) 52 hours (for 5.5 hour mission) 
MTTR 1.0 hour 1.0 hour 
Ao:FMC 0.80 .70 
Ao:MC 0.85 .70 
DDMHIFH 11.6 hours 11.6 hours 
Table 3.3. SOA ILSP System Readiness Objectives [Ref. 18 and 19] 
c. Subsection 3: Acquisition Strategy 
The Acquisition Strategy, as defined by the SOA ILSP, was based on two 
prime contractors, Sikorsky Aircraft (SA) for the MH-60K, and Boeing Helicopter Company 
(BHC) for the MH-47E, having total system performance responsibility for their respective 
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aircraft. The only stipulation was that each prime would use the Government directed 
subcontractor of IBM for the lAS. 
The Acquisition Strategy subsection of the SOA ILSP was further broken 
down into seven areas. Those areas are discussed below. 
( 1) Life-Cycle Cost. A Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) analysis was performed 
in September 1986 on the SOA MEP using a generic LCC model tailored to suit the small 
number of modified aircraft and the equipment complexity. The LCC analysis was used 
during technical and cost evaluation of both the SA and BHC proposals to assure "continuing 
control of Operation and Support (O&S) costs." [Ref 18] The SOA ILSP stated that the 
LCC analysis revealed that "minimum life-cycle costs could be realized with the 
implementation of the following: 
• A contractually required SA and BHC reliability and maintainability (R&M) 
program to minimize O&S costs. 
• The use oflnterservice Supply Support Agreements (ISSAs) whenever possible 
for the support of hardware and software currently in use by other services. 
• The use of contractor logistic support above the A VUM level. 
• A two level maintenance concept." [Ref. 18] 
(2) Support Risks. SA and BHC were contractually required to 
maximize the use of on-board troubleshooting and built-in tests (BIT). The goal of this 
requirement was to provide fault detection, along with fault isolation of all failures detected. 
To further reduce support risks, the SOA ILSP directed that the 
Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process be used to determine and define logistic support and 
personnel tasks and skills for the operation, maintenance and support of the system. It also 
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directed that, to the maximum extent possible, equipment and operational and diagnostic 
software be compatible with existing systems or systems in the process of being developed. 
[Ref 18] 
(3) Manpower and Personnel Integration Requirements. The SOA 
Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Program was tailored to be consistent 
with the NDI nature of the program. The tailoring was driven by the specific aircraft to be 
modified, the special equipment to be integrated into the aircraft, and the unique SOF 
organization receiving the SOA. [Ref 18] 
( 4) Source Selection. A sole source, firm-fixed price letter contract was 
signed by BHC, for the MH-47E, on 2 December 1987, and by SA, for the MH-60K, on 26 
January 1988. The contracts were for the design and development of a prototype aircraft (one 
of each type) that met ROC requirements. The SOA ILSP stated that ILS considerations were 
a major factor in the source selection process in order to ensure that the MEP, not only met 
performance requirements, but was also economically supportable. [Ref 18] 
(5) Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability. The reliability and 
maintainability (R&M) program included quality engineering, parts control, standardization, 
and warranty program requirements. The SOA ILSP directed that RAM be addressed in 
accordance with selected requirements contained in the SOA specification. The purpose of 
these efforts was to ensure that SOA RAM was consistent with ROC requirements. [Ref 18] 
( 6) Elements of Support Acquisition. The following ILS elements were 
included in the solicitation documents and were required to be addressed in the contractor's 
ILS program: [Ref 18] 
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• Maintenance Planning 
• Support and Test Equipment 
• Supply Support 
• Transportation and Transportability 
• Technical Data 
• Manpower and Personnel 
• Training and Training Devices 
• Facilities 
• Computer Resources Support 
• Packaging, Handling, and Storage 
• Design Influence 
• Standardization and Interoperability 
(7) Transportability. Transportability requirements were included in 
the SA and BHC contracts. They called for the MH-60K to be C-5, C-141, and C-17 
transportable and for the MH-47E to be C-5 transportable. [Ref 18 and 19] 
(8) Software Systems Engineering Configuration Control Management. 
(Only included in the MH-60K ILSP.) SA was directed to provide software system 
integration logistical support for the MH-60K, in accordance with the prime item development 
specification (PIDS) baseline submitted by SA [Ref 19] 
The Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM, now the Aviation and 
Troop Command or ATCOM) Directorate for Life Cycle Software Engineering was 
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responsible for the management of Post-Deployment Software Support (PDSS) for the SOA 
program after the aircraft were fielded. [Ref 19] 
(9) Hardware Systems Engineering Configuration Control 
Management. (Only included in the MH-60K ILSP.) The MH-60K ILSP stated that the 
following agencies were responsible for the appropriate support. The U.S. Army Avionics 
Research and Development Activity was responsible for providing avionics systems 
engineering support. The A VSCOM Directorate for Engineering was responsible for 
providing airframe systems engineering support. And the A VSCOM Directorate for 
Maintenance was responsible for automatic test equipment (ATE) I test program sets (TPS). 
Overall configuration control of the aircraft remained with PM SO A. [Ref 19] 
d. Subsection 4: Logistic Support Analysis Strategy 
The SOA Program was essentially an electronics modification to existipg 
fielded aircraft. As a result, the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) I Logistics Support Analysis 
Record (LSAR) strategy was tailored to meet the NDI nature of the program and the 
streamlined acquisition process. In general, where fielded systems were adopted and installed 
to meet the requirements of the program, Army, Navy, or Air Force technical publications, 
engineering drawings, and cataloging information were utilized for the purpose of the 
program. If the adopted and installed system was a commercially available item, the available 
commercial data was converted to Army format and used. 
LSAR data was to be prepared for A VUM level systems for each aircraft. The 
prime contractors prepared integrated support plans (ISPs) that specified how spares quantities 
would be computed to support the test program as well as the production aircraft. 
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Publications, engineering drawings, LSAR data, and training literature were to be provided by 
SA for the MH-60K and by BHC for the MH-4 7E. [Ref 19] 
(1) LSA Tasks. Table 3.4 identifies the tailored LSA tasks that were 
scheduled to be accomplished for each aircraft. MIL-STD-1388-1A, "Logistics Support 
Analysis," [Ref 10] was used as a guide in selecting these tasks. 
SOA TAILORED LSA PROGRAM 
Tasks nerformed for the MH-60K Tasks nerformed for the MH-47E 
101 LSA Strategy 101 LSA Strategy 
102 LSAPlan 201 Use Study 
103 Program and Design Review 202 Standardization 
301 Functional Requirements Identification 203 Comparative Analysis 
301.2.4 Operations and Maintenance Tasks 204 Technological Opportunities 
301.2.4.1 Identify Corrective Maintenance Tasks 301 Functional Requirements Identification 
301.2.4.2 Identify Preventive Maintenance Tasks 302 Support System Alternatives 
401 Task Analysis 303 Evaluation Tradeoffs 
401.2.1 Task Analysis 402 Early Fielding Analysis 
401.2.2 Analysis Documentation 
401.2.3 New/Critical Support 
401.2.4 Training Requirements 
401.2.6 Management Plans 
40 1.2. 7 Transportability Analysis 
401.2.8 Provisioning Requirements 
401.2.9 Validation 
401.2.10 ILS Output Products 
401.2.11 LSAR Updates 
402 Early Fielding Analysis 
402.2.4 Combat Resource Requirements 
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SOA TAILORED LSA PROGRAM 
Tasks Qerformed for the MH-60K Tasks Qerformed for the MH-47E 
501 Supportability T &E and Verification 
501.2.2 Objectives and Criteria 
501.2.3 Updates and Corrective Actions 
501.2.5 Supportability Assessment 
Table 3.4. SOA Tailored LSA Program [Ref. 18 and 19] 
(2) MH-60K Sources ofLSA Documentation. The LSAR for the UH-
60A, MANPRINT, and support equipment recommendations were the primary data sources 
for the MH-60K LSA effort. [Ref. 19] 
(3) MH-47E Sources of LSA Documentation. BHC did not 
accomplish LSAILSAR on the CH-47D. Instead, a Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA) 
was done. BHC used a software conversion program to format MEA documentation to 
LSAR formats. [Ref. 18] 
e. Subsection 5: Supportability Test and Evaluation Concept 
Specifics on the SOA supportability test and evaluation (T &E) concept were 
included in the SOA Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). During the Technical Test 
(TT), the aircraft were flown and supported by the prime contractors. During the Preliminary 
Airworthiness Evaluation (PAE), the aircraft were flown by the Army and supported by the 
prime contractors. During the follow-on test and evaluation (FOT &E), the aircraft were flown 
by the Army and supported by Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) and Army A VUM. [Ref. 
19] 
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f. Subsection 6: ILS Element Plans 
( 1) Design Influence. On the overall system design of peculiar 1 parts, 
SA and BHC were contractually required to give equal emphasis to ILS activities, technical 
activities, and cost activities. The SOA ILSP directed that, to the maximum extent possible, 
MH-60K and MH-47E hardware and software were to be compatible with existing operational 
systems. Where new systems were developed and introduced into the inventory, they were 
to be logistically supportable by the existing support organization. [Ref 18] 
(2) Maintenance Plan. The maintenance plan for the SOA consisted 
of a combination of Army and CLS. This plan called for a "two level" system of maintenance. 
Level one consisted of Army personnel performing all A VUM level tasks and all A VIM 
common2 tasks. Level two consisted of contractor personnel performing all A VIM peculiar 
tasks and all Depot level tasks under CLS. CLS would also provide technical back up support 
for the Army A VUM and A VIM common maintenance. It was the intent of the SOA 
Program and the user to have CLS for the life of the system. (CLS is now knqwn as Life-
Cycle Contractor Support, or LCCS.) [Ref 18] 
The maintenance concept under this two level maintenance plan was 
to have the unit troubleshoot and isolate the faulty component at the A VUM I A VIM common 
level. After fault isolation, the unit would remove and replace the faulty component at the 
A VUM I A VIM common level. The unit would also perform on-aircraft and in-shop A VUM 
1 Peculiar, as used in the SOA ILSP, refers to any subsystem, part, equipment, wiring, 
mount, software, etc., not currently on the UH-60L or the CH-47D. 
2 Common, as used in the SOA ILSP, refers to any subsystem, part, equipment, wiring, 
mount, software, etc., that is currently on the UH-60L or the CH-47D. 
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I A VIM common maintenance actions. Contractor personnel would perform A VIM peculiar 
and Depot level maintenance and on-aircraft A VIM peculiar and Depot level maintenance 
actions. There were no plans to organically repair or overhaul failed peculiar components due 
to the "limited" quantities of those items. [Ref 18] 
(3) MANPRINT. The SOA MANPRINT Program was tailored to be 
consistent with the NDI nature of the program. Four MANPRINT elements were addressed 
in the program: (1) human factors; (2) system safety; (3) biomedical health and hazard; and 
( 4) training. No increase in manpower and no new Military Operational Specialties (MOSs) 
were deemed necessary. [Ref 18] 
(4) Supply Support. The prime contractors were directed to maintain 
a "1 00 percent LSA-036/PMR" (Provisioning Master Record) data base that was compatible 
with the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS). This requirement afforded the 
Government the flexibility to establish a total provisioning master data record should the 
determination ever be made to organically support the SOA. The p~ovisioning process was 
a joint effort between the Government and the prime contractors. However, the Government 
made the final decision on coding, range, and quantity of spare parts. [Ref 18] 
( 5) Support Equipment and TMDE. The SOA MEP was designed to 
be fault isolated through Built in Test (BIT) and Built in Test Equipment (BITE). A VUM and 
A VIM common level maintenance on the MEP consisted of fault isolation to the Line 
Replaceable Unit (LRU) level and replacement of faulty LRUs. The SOA ILSP directed the 
maximum use of standard tools and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) 
in the design of the MEP. [Ref. 18] 
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The primary support equipment (SE) effort was on the screening of all 
SE requirements identified through design, maintenance, LSA, and LCC and ILS trade off 
studies. Those activities were to result in a recommendation of an SE candidate that best 
satisfied the need for each maintenance task. The recommendation process was to provide 
the most cost effective and work efficient mix of ground-based versus built-in support features 
for maximum aircraft self-support capability. [Ref 18] 
(6) Training and Training Devices. The SOA training system was 
. based on an Integrated Training System (ITS). It included all programs of instructions (POls), 
technical and courseware material, and devices necessary to train operator, maintainer and 
support (OMS) personnel for the aircraft and MEP at A VUM level. As part of the ITS, the 
prime contractors were responsible for: (1) Providing factory training for Government 
personnel to meet test requirements; (2) Providing, maintaining, supporting, and delivering all 
training hardware ,software, and courseware required to conduct factory training; (3) 
Providing each student with a training package; and ( 4) Providing Instructor and Key 
Personnel Training (IKPT) to include all training documentation necessary for establishing 
Government new equipment training (NET) and institutional training capabilities. [Ref 18] 
A Training Device System (TDS) was the basis for determining training 
device requirements and utilization. The design of the SOA TDS was based on the SOA ITS 
characteristics of traceable, hierarchical relationships to the OMS tasks for which each 
individual device would be used. The TDS suite of devices included: ( 1) Combat mission 
simulators (one MH-60K and one MH-47E); (2) Cockpit procedural trainers; (3) Part task 
trainers; ( 4) Classroom trainers; and ( 5) Maintenance trainers. [Ref 18] 
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(7) Technical Data. The prime contractors were directed to utilize 
current standard aircraft manuals as the baseline for the development of SOA aircraft manuals. 
All publications to support the MH-60K and MH-47E production were to be commercially 
prepared, updated, stocked, stored, and issued by their respective prime contractors. [Ref 18] 
(8) Computer Resources Support. Embedded computer hardware and 
software was specified and treated as configuration items and as integral parts of the system 
and applicable subsystems. A computer resource management plan (CRMP) was developed 
and maintained for each aircraft. [Ref 19] 
(9) Packaging, Handling, and Storage. The ll.,S aspects of Packaging, 
Handling, and Storage (PHS) included consideration of special equipment, reusable 
containers, preservation materials, and other items needed to ensure adequate protection of 
items during shipment, handling, and storage. Existing PHS equipment and procedures were 
evaluated to determine their applicability to the SOA Program. The overall effort was 
coordinated with A VSCOM and the AMC Packaging, Storage, and Containerization Center. 
[Ref 18] 
(1 0) Transportation and Transportability. The MH-60K was designed 
to be transportable by the following means: ( 1) By air in the C-141, C-5, and C-17 aircraft; 
(2) By ship on all ships presently employed for sea transport ofUH-60A; (3) By road on any 
standard highway truck/semitrailer vehicle having an air-ride suspension system; and ( 4) By 
self deployment utilizing in-flight refueling and extended tank support. The MH-47E was 
designed to be transportable by the following means: (1) By air in the C-5 aircraft; (2) By ship 
on all ships presently employed for sea transport ofCH-47D; (3) By road on any standard 
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highway truck/semitrailer vehicle having an air-ride suspension system; and (4) By self 
deployment utilizing in-flight refueling and extended tank support. [Ref 18 and 19] 
(11) Facilities. Existing UH-60L and CH-47D facilities were 
determined to be adequate with the exception of classified equipment storage. Detailed 
facilities requirements were documented in the Material Fielding Plans (MFPs ). [Ref 18 and 
19] 
(12) Standardization and Interoperability. The SOA Program 
modifications did not affect the standardization and interoperability (S&I) of the modified 
aircraft. [Ref 18] 
g. Subsection 7: Support Resource Funds 
Preliminary estimates of costs to acquire and support the SOA were developed 
and included in each ILSP. The estimated cost of acquisition was based upon an Independent 
Government Cost Estimate (IGCE) and was in accordance with the current Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) for 23 MH-60Ks and 17 MH-47Es. The costs,_ as listed, were within 
the fiscal year (FY) 1987 through 1993 procurement funding profile and were adequate to 
cover the quantity of aircraft as outlined in the POM. [Ref. 18 and 19] 
h. Subsection 8: Post-Fielding Assessments 
The requirements for an initial fielding assessment and a post-provisioning 
review were assessed and addressed in the MFP. [Ref 18 and 19] 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
ILS in NDI acquisition programs is unarguably one of the most challenging aspects of 
doing business in this accelerated environment. The fact that a program plans on only 
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procunng a small number of systems, and that those systems are among the most 
technologically advanced in the world, further complicates the issue. That was just the 
situation that the SOA Program was facing at its inception in 1986. 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the SOA MEP in an attempt to provide 
the reader with an understanding of the technologically advanced systems that the SOA 
Program was tasked with integrating. The chapter also provided an overview of the SOA 
ILSP in order to give the reader an appreciation of the ILS planning that went into the SOA 
Program. 
It is imperative to remember that the ILSP is the principle logistics document for an 
acquisition program. It was my premise at the start of section C in this chapter that the quality 
and thoroughness ofthe ILSP is usually a good indicator of the quality and thoroughness of 
the ILS effort. The SOA ILSP appears to be a quality, thorough document, but was it 
successful at planning and implementing an effective ILS program at the user level? That is 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As you will recall from chapter one, the primary assumption that I made in this thesis 
is that logical and useful ILS lessons learned can be derived from an analysis of a recently 
implemented ILSP. Another key assumption that I made in conjunction with this first 
assumption is that personnel intimately involved with the implementation of an ILSP are the 
. most qualified to provide realistic, current, and relevant insight into the ILS process. 
Given these assumptions, the analysis of the SOA Program's ILSP was conducted by 
utilizing interview comments from three groups of people. Those three groups included 
Technology Application Program Office (T APO), or Program Management (PM) personnel, 
Boeing I Sikorsky Aircraft Services (BSAS), or contractor personnel, and 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), or user personnel. Each of these 
groups of personnel is intimately involved with the logistical support of the SO A. Their 
comments were used to assess the challenges of implementing the SOA Program's ILSP and 
thereby deducing the major factors which had a significant impact on the development and 
implementation of that ILSP. 
The advantage of using three different groups of personnel as the basis for conducting 
the analysis is that it provides three different perspectives on the challenges of the development 
and implementation of the ILSP. The PM provides a macro perspective on the entire SOA 
supportability arena with an emphasis on what has caused problems at the development and 
sustainment level. The user provides a candid, personalized perspective on what is going, or 
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has gone, wrong with the actual hands on support of the aircraft. And the contractor provides 
a nongovernment, professional appraising perspective on supportability as constrained by the 
Life-Cycle Contractor Support (LCCS) concept. Combining these three perspectives results 
in a synergistic perspective that provides the basis for an accurate evaluation of the 
development and implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP. 
This chapter is comprised of two main sections. The first major section consists of an 
analysis of the following four elements ofiLS: (1) Maintenance Planning; (2) Supply Support; 
(3) Support Equipment; and (4) Technical Data (Maintenance and Operator Publications). 
As described above, the analysis is conducted by utilizing interview comments on these four 
elements. The second major section consists of an identification of the "major factors" that 
I believe had a significant impact on the development and implementation of the SOA 
Program's ILSP. These factors were derived from the analysis conducted on the four 
elements of ILS examined. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to identify the major factors that had a 
significant impact on the development and implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP. 
These factors will then form the basis for developing the lessons learned and conclusions 
discussed in the next chapter. The secondary purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader 
with an opportunity to analyze, for themselves, the comments provided by the interviewees. 
From the reader's personal analysis, he or she may discover additional lessons learned or 
"pearls of wisdom"which may be applicable to their own specific program or situation. 
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B. ANALYSIS 
The analysis is organized by ILS element, by interview group (i.e. PM, user, and 
contractor), and by category. The categories include: (1) the concept; (2) problems with the 
concept; (3) successes and failures; and (4) planning shortfalls. (Each category is not 
necessarily used in every ILS element analyzed.) 
1. Maintenance Planning 
DODI 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures" [Ref. 8] 
defines maintenance planning as "the process conducted to evolve and establish maintenance 
concepts and requirements for the lifetime of the system." Recall from chapter three that the 
maintenance concept for the SOA basically consists of a "two-level", LCCS arrangement 
where the user provides A VUM and common A VIM support and the contractor provides 
peculiar A VIM and depot support. 
a. The PM's Perspective on the Maintenance Concept 
The PM's perspective on the two-level LCCS maintenance concept is one of 
qualified support. Major Bill Parker, the Assistant PM (APM) for Material Readiness and 
Logistics at T APO stated that if he had been in PM SOA when the concept was originally 
developed, he would tell you that LCCS is the way to go. Not necessarily because its the best 
way to support the aircraft, but because its the best way to support them given the manpower, 
funding, and training constraints present in the Army and especially in low density weapon 
system acquisitions. Major Parker went on to state that, since the aircraft have so much SOF 
peculiar equipment installed, the Army no longer has the capability to effectively maintain the 
aircraft by itself. [Ref. 20] 
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Major Parker qualified his support of the two-level LCCS maintenance 
concept by stating that he was not convinced that the LCCS contract, the way it is organized 
now, is the best way of doing business. 
I think we need to go back in and refine the statement of work (SOW) and fix 
the things we don't like. . . It comes back to the mission needs statement 
(MNS) and writing, not what you want, but what you need! We need to get 
all the smart people together, locked away somewhere away from the flagpole, 
away from the telephones, and say - lets define what we really need here ... 
Lets look at the Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) structure, the hanger 
space, the organizational structure at the A VUM and A VIM levels and figure 
out what we can do smarter on the Army side of the house and then, 
determine what augmentation we need from outside contractors ... We can 
blend that together and come up with a refined system based on what we've 
already got. [Ref. 20] 
b. The User's Perspective on the Maintenance Concept 
The user's perspective on the two-level LCCS maintenance concept is one of 
questionable usefulness in A VUM and A VIM support, and absolute necessity in depot level 
component support. Chief Warrant Officer (CW2) Steve Blasey, the A VUM Maintenance 
Technician inC Company, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR(A) stated that LCCS involvement in 
the day to day maintenance of the aircraft doesn't provide them any additional capability over 
what they already possess. [Ref. 21] The point of no additional maintenance capability was 
also stated for A VIM maintenance capability by Major Mike Taliento, the F Company, 1st 
Battalion, 160th SOAR(A) A VIM commander and Major William Books, the D Company, 
2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR(A) A VIM commander. 
As for depot level maintenance support, Major Books stated that the two-level 
LCCS concept provides depot level repairs for the closed loop and peculiar components that 
would otherwise not exist. As far as airframe peculiar depot support goes, however, BSAS 
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simply provides duplicative modification work order (MWO) capability above and beyond 
what the existing DynCorps and E-Systems contracts already provide. [Ref. 22] 
CW2 Blasey also stated that the maintenance concept for the MH-60K (and 
presumably for the MH-47E) had required a cultural shift for the Army mechanics and 
technicians. "Its a different philosophy in maintaining the aircraft. Black box replacement, 
BIT I BITE trouble shooting, automated logbooks, etc ... " He went on to conclude, however, 
that, "we are starting to get institutional knowledge built up on the MH-60K. But at the 
beginning, we really didn't have a good understanding of the complete maintenance and 
supply concept." [Ref. 21] 
c. The Contractor's Perspective on the Maintenance Concept 
The contractor's perspective on the two-level LCCS maintenance concept is 
one of necessity. Mr. Mike Brickner, the BSAS Operations Manager, stated that he thinks 
that the LCCS concept is the only way that you can maintain a system that is as complex as 
the SOA and has as many "peculiar" components onboard. [Ref. 23] Mr. Kurt.Porter, the 
BSAS Deputy General Manager reiterated that point with an example of how the concept was 
originally developed. He said that: 
Mr. Cribbins, Mr. Ambrose and a bunch of other guys from the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) Aviation Office looked at the ILS concept 
and said, "low density weapon system, less than 100 aircraft, its not worth the 
investment on the Army's part to put in an overhaul facility at Corpus Christi 
Army Depot (CCAD), to put in a training base at Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) to train mechanics and pilots specifically for these 
aircraft. Its not worth it to integrate high levels of test equipment at the unit 
level because of the technological insertion that they (the aircraft) were built 
to accept." For example, five years from now, the MFDs go away and you go 
to flat plate screens. So why go out and invest Army industrial funds to build 
up a base in DoD when you're going to scrap it in five years. You're better 
off to do a short term investment of, say, five million dollars in the Integrated 
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Avionics Bench (lAB), you run it for five or six years, cut your (component) 
failures down, test it as close to the aircraft as you can get it, and that was 
basically the concept. . . . You let a contractor do that, and have the green 
suiters do their day to day maintenance. After they swap out a black box, they 
go back to doing the mission. [Ref. 24] 
Mr. Brickner went on to state that the only problem with the LCCS concept 
is that not everyone involved understands the complete concept and the level of involvement 
required. As an example, Mr. Brickner pointed out the difference between a sustaining 
engineering question for a UH-60L and a MH-60K. 
If there is an engineering call, a question from a field service representative 
(FSR) or a logistics assistance representative (LAR), and they want to know 
what the repair is for a given item or what the inspection criteria is for an item. 
In the regular system you just see the answer. You don't see the UH-60 PM' s 
budget with Sikorsky for sustaining engineering to answer those questions. In 
the case of this system, you see it all, and pay for it. Engineering support is 
part of the LCCS contract (because the MH-60K is not managed by PM 
Blackhawk, its managed by TAPO.) [Ref. 23] 
d. The PM's Perspective on Problems with the Maintenance Concept 
The PM sees very few problems with the two-level LCCS maintenance 
concept. A couple of minor concerns were mentioned in Major Parker's comments above. 
In addition to those concerns, Ms. Lorraine Lamsa, an acquisition logistician in T APO, gave 
two additional areas that she feels are problems. 
First, she feels that LCCS, as it is currently organized under BSAS, is too 
bureaucratic. She stated that since BSAS is a joint venture, and not actually part ofBoeing 
or Sikorsky, (and remember that Boeing and Sikorsky are the prime contractors for the SOA), 
all formal matters dealing with either of those two organizations must be addressed through 
BSAS rather than with Boeing or Sikorsky directly. This simply complicates contractual and 
sustainment matters more than need be. [Ref. 25] 
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Second, she feels that it is questionable whether or not the Government is 
getting "good value for all of the offsite LCCS support." (By offsite, she is referring to 
locations other than Ft. Campbell Kentucky where the I 60th SOAR( A) is located.) She stated 
that "a lot more money is tied up in offsite LCCS support than with onsite support (i.e. 
engineering support, program management, etc ... )" She further justified her statement by 
claiming that "we (TAPO) only have a very fuzzy idea of what we're getting for our money." 
[Ref. 25] 
e. The User's Perspective on Problems with the Maintenance Concept 
The user sees primarily two problems arising out of the two-level LCCS 
maintenance concept as it is currently established. One area that was mentioned by both 
Major Taliento and Major Books was the belief that there is really very little, if any, A VIM 
peculiar maintenance on the aircraft. This being the case, they feel that there is no need for 
A VIM peculiar maintenance to be in the LCCS SOW. This belief is reinforced by Mr. 
Brickner's statement that, "when you get down to it, there is not that much AVIM peculiar 
maintenance" on these aircraft. Major Taliento specifically states that: 
We have the capability here in F Company to do a tremendous amount of 
depot level repair (and all of the A VIM repair) on these aircraft. All the lAB 
does for us is tell us that a black box is, in fact, broken. Not what's wrong 
with it. CW4 Doris (F Company's Avionics Technician) has the capability to 
fix "a lot of the stuff' that goes to BSAS. Just like we've done with every 
system that our aircraft was modified with before the MH-60K came along. 
I also feel that we need to move toward more self sufficiency, just like we've 
always had. That's been one of our strengths in the past. We could fix things 
that regular Army units had to evacuate through the normal supply and repair 
channels. [Ref. 26] 
CW2 Blasey notes another problem with the two-level, LCCS maintenance 
concept. He states that now that BSAS is doing depot level MWOs, the units must now deal 
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with a fourth depot organizations applying modifications. He notes that the problem with four 
different depot organizations is that each one of the four applies and documents MWOs 
differently. Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) is home of the Special Operations Forces 
Support Activity (SOFSA). E-Systems currently has the SOFSA contract where they install 
major SOF peculiar MWOs and aircraft upgrades. DynCorps has the 160th SOAR(A) 
supplemental contract. DynCorps installs local I 60th SOAR(A) MWOs. OLR has the Army 
wide MWO contract. OLR installs Army common MWOs. And now BSAS has the SOA 
LCCS contract. Among other things, BSAS is responsible for SOA peculiar MWOs. CW2 
Blasey claims that this causes confusion with noncommonality of wiring diagrams, historical 
record updates, and other maintenance related documentation. [Ref 21] 
f. The Contractor's Perspective on Problems with the Maintenance 
Concept 
For all intents and purposes, the contractor does not see any problem with the 
two-level LCCS maintenance concept. 
g. The PM's Perspective on Maintenance Plan Successes and Failures 
From the macro level that the PM views the maintenance plan, none of the 
interviewees had observed or been informed of any notable successes or failures in the actual 
conduct of maintenance on the aircraft. In general, according to Major Parker, actual "wrench 
turning" maintenance on the SOA has not been a problem. [Ref 20] 
h. The User's Perspective on Maintenance Plan Successes and 
Failures 
The user sees things a little differently than TAPO. The primary failure with 
the maintenance plan, as viewed by the user, is the lack of expertise in BSAS maintenance 
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personnel. Following a series of incidents with BSAS maintenance personnel, Major Taliento 
sent a letter to the 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR( A) Battalion Commander. Attached to the letter 
was a 20 page document noting deficiencies in BSAS operations. Major Taliento's letter 
stated that: 
I would recommend that BSAS conduct an internal ARMS (Aviation 
Resource Management Survey) or similar type of quality assurance, quality 
control assessment and make changes to their operating procedures as 
required. To date, I have not seen anything back from BSAS or the RAMO 
(Regimental Aviation Maintenance Officer) stating that a corrective action has 
been accomplished or instituted as a result of our meeting with them. I would 
also suggest to the COR (Contracting Officer Representative) that he 
implement his contractual quality assurance checks ... and make sure that the 
contractor is meeting or exceeding the requirements of the contract. ... [Ref. 
26] 
Major Taliento stated that his primary concern with BSAS was trust. He was 
most concerned with what F Company didn't see, or hadn't caught them doing. He concluded 
his discussion on this topic by stating that, "at the level we're operating (National Command 
Authority control), and with our mission requirements ("Black" Special Operations), the 
maintenance piece has got to be perfect! We don't need people who don't know what's going 
on." [Ref. 26] 
This sentiment was reflected by Major Books and CW2 Blasey as well. In 
general, the user does not have confidence in BSAS maintenance personnel capability, skill, 
and diligence. [Ref. 21] 
i. The Contractor's Perspective on Maintenance Plan Successes and 
Failures 
According to the contractor, they have not experienced any noteworthy 
successes or failures while actually conducting the SOA maintenance plan. They did, 
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however, admit to a slightly hostile working relationship with the user. Mr. Brickner attributed 
this relationship to a misunderstanding in work requirements between the user and BSAS. 
[Ref 23] 
j. The PM's Perspective on Maintenance Planning Shortfalls 
The only maintenance planning shortfall identified by T APO was that of 
inadequate Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) in relation to maintenance tasks. As an example 
of this, Major Parker discussed the Lycoming (now Allied Signal Engines), T -714 engine used 
on the MH-4 7E. He stated that the only difference between the T -714 engine and the T -712 
engine (the engine used on CH-47Ds) is the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control 
(F ADEC) system and the fuel control unit. Since these are the only differences between the 
two engines, it would seem logical that the user's engine mechanics could work on them. That 
is not the case however. Since the T-714 is classified as a peculiar item, only the LCCS 
contractor can work on it. Major Parker stated that this type of planning shortfall should have 
been caught during LSA and is now costing the Government money. [Ref 20] 
k. The User's Perspective on Maintenance Planning Shortfalls 
The only maintenance planning shortfall identified by the 160th SOAR( A) was 
also that of inadequate LSA in relation to maintenance tasks. Not only did they concur with 
Major Parker's example above, but they also feel that there is no need for the LCCS 
contractor to conduct A VIM peculiar maintenance (if there really is such a thing.) Major 
Taliento and Major Books both agree that their units are capable of performing all A VIM level 
maintenance on the MH-60K and MH-47E. [Ref 22 and 26] 
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1. The Contractor's Perspective on Maintenance Planning Shortfalls 
The contractor mentioned only one maintenance planning shortfall. That 
shortfall was the failure to place the SOA Program in the ILS assessment file where the 
Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA) (now the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity 
(AMSAA)) could have had insight into the program and identified potential weak areas in the 
ILSP. Had this occurred, many of the problems mentioned in this section, and the sections 
to follow, may have been alleviated through early detection and correction. [Ref. 24] 
m Maintenance Planning Analysis Summary 
In general, the two-level LCCS maintenance concept is considered sound. 
There is very little disagreement that BSAS is critical for closed loop and peculiar item depot 
level maintenance, even though the A VIM Company's feel that they have the capability to 
perform some of the depot level black box repair in house. Organization of the current LCCS 
contract, and the LCCS contractor's responsibilities are questioned however. (It is important 
to note here that I do not feel that the LCCS concept, as established, is a true two-level 
maintenance organization. Rather, I submit that it is, in fact, a four-level organization. Level 
one is A VUM. Level two is common A VIM. Level three is peculiar A VIM. And level four 
is depot. This is not a streamlined maintenance structure as the ILSP would have you believe.) 
With regard to the LCCS contractor's responsibilities, there appear to be 
numerous peculiar maintenance tasks that could be performed by user personnel. 
Furthermore, airframe peculiar A VIM tasks appear to be almost none existent. This seems 
to indicate that either a thorough LSA maintenance task analysis was not performed during 
ILS planning, or the level of difficulty associated with some tasks was overestimated. In either 
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case, it appears that another LSA maintenance task analysis should be performed in order to 
determine if the peculiar AVIM LCCS SOW requirement is actually necessary. 
With regard to the organization of the LCCS contract, there is concern with 
the addition of a fourth organization capable of applying depot level MWOs. This capability 
appears to be redundant and arguably, not necessary. Furthermore, it complicates the 
performance of maintenance on the aircraft. 
A final issue with the maintenance concept is the tense working relationship 
between the user and BSAS maintenance personnel. The user does not have confidence in 
the capability, expertise, and diligence of the current LCCS contractor maintenance personnel. 
This fact adversely affects the overall performance of the two-level LCCS maintenance 
concept as planned. This is not a maintenance planning issue per se, but it is an issue that 
must be resolved immediately. 
2. Supply Support 
DODI 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedur~s" [Ref. 8] 
defines supply support as "all management actions, procedures and techniques used to 
determine requirements to acquire, catalog, receive, store, transfer, issue and dispose of 
secondary items. This includes provisioning for initial support as well as replenishment supply 
support." Recall from chapter three that the provisioning process was a joint effort between 
the Government and the prime contractors, with the Government having the fmal decision on 
coding, range, and quantity of spare parts. 
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The overall concept of supply support was not discussed in the SOA ILSP and will 
therefore be described here. In general, the supply support concept for the SOA is similar to 
the maintenance concept for the aircraft. It is a two part system with heavy reliance on LCCS. 
Repair parts and components are categorized as common, peculiar, or closed-loop. 
Common items are those items which are currently used on the UH-60L and CH-47D fleet. 
These items are requisitioned and disposed of through the standard Army supply system. 
Peculiar items are those items which are not currently used on the UH-60L and CH-4 7D fleet. 
Closed-loop items are those items which are used on the UH-60L and CH-47D fleet, but have 
engineering directed reduced life spans because of the increased operating weights and flight 
environments of the MH-60K and MH-47E. Peculiar and closed-loop are requisitioned and 
disposed of through the LCCS contractor. In this supply support system, BSAS (the LCCS 
contractor) acts as the national inventory control point (NICP) and depot for all peculiar and 
closed-loop items. 
a. The PM's Perspective on the Supply Support Concept 
The PM's perspective on the supply support concept is one of necessity. 
Major Parker admits that, even though it is a more complex setup than most people would like, 
its a necessary evil given the complexity of the aircraft, the peculiar (and closed-loop) 
components, and the low density of aircraft. All in all, T APO feels that the supply support 
concept is sound. [Ref 20] 
b. The User's Perspective on the Supply Support Concept 
The user's perspective on the supply support concept is one of additional work 
and nonseamless interface. Major Taliento states that the two part supply support system 
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causes him to have to track and manage two totally independent and different supply systems. 
Additionally, it causes him to have to deploy with two separate repair part inventories. [Ref 
26] 
CW2 Blasey reiterated the point made by Major Taliento. He stated that its 
simply an inconvenience to have to deal with the two independent systems. Its no longer a 
seamless interface with the supply system, now we have to track common items, peculiar 
items, and closed loop items and make sure that we're ordering them through the right system. 
[Ref 21] 
c. The Contractor's Perspective on the Supply Support Concept 
The contractor's perspective on the supply support concept is one of value 
added. Mr. Brickner stated that the LCCS supply support concept provides the necessary 
NICP and depot services necessary to manage all of the peculiar and closed-loop items. He 
further stated that the LCCS concept, with supply support on-site, provides a much more 
responsive system than the user could get through the normal supply channel. Furthermore, 
he claimed that it is highly doubtful that the normal supply channels would accept the small 
quantity of peculiar and closed-loop items since there are no depot support agreements in place 
for the repair of those items. [Ref. 23] 
Mr. Porter added to these comments by stating that the supply support concept 
compliments the maintenance concept. He stated that the modifications to the aircraft were 
designed to be Line Replaceable Units (LRUs ). The concept is that the green suiter pulls out 
a black box, walks across the street to the LCCS supply facility, and exchanges a bad one for 
a good one. In actuality, its a simple reparable exchange (RX) setup. Mr. Porter further 
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claims that, if an Army supply sergeant walks across the street and can't get a replacement part 
immediately, then we (BSAS) have not done our job. [Ref 24] 
d. The PM's Perspective on Problems with the Supply Support Concept 
In general, the PM feels that the supply support concept is a good solution to 
the complex problems associated with the SO A. TAPO is aware of the concerns that the user 
has with the concept, but they don't see an immediate solution to those concerns. 
e. The User's Perspective on Problems with the Supply Support 
Concept 
The user's primary concerns with the supply support concept deal with the 
multiple supply channels mentioned above, and the constraints placed on them by peculiar and 
closed-loop item requirements during deployments. Major Taliento used the MH-60K main 
rotor blade as an example. He stated that the MH-60K main rotor blade is a closed loop item. 
Therefore, "when we (1st Battalion, 160th SOAR( A)) deploy, we now have to take along a 
supply of regular (common) main rotor blades for the MH-60L DAP (Defensive Armed 
Penetrators) and the MH-60L C2 (Command and Control), as well as a supply ofMH-60K 
main rotor blades." Major Taliento stated that the space during deployments was limited 
before, but now "we're at the point of having to decide what critical items we can't take on 
deployments." [Ref 26] 
states: 
CW2 Blasey mentioned another key point in relation to this problem. He 
We're doing OK maintaining the MH-60Ks here. But that's the key! For the 
past year, we've been here. When I need a spare part, I walk across the street 
and get one. My concern is when we start our normal deployment schedule 
again this summer, I think we're going to be "hurting." For example, take 
when we were deployed to Haiti on that aircmft carrier. Now ifl need a black 
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box, what am I going to do. I can't walk across the street anymore, and F 
Company has holes in their deployment support kits (DSKs ). [Ref 21] 
He further went on to state that, even on an aircraft carrier, he could "drop a requisition" 
through the normal supply channels and eventually get the part. With the peculiar and closed-
loop items however, he would have to rely on a make shift system of Federal Express and 
other shipping means to get the part. [Ref 21] 
f. The Contractor's Perspective on Problems with the Supply Support 
Concept 
The contractor does not see any significant or noteworthy problems with the 
supply support concept as it is currently organized. 
g. The PM's Perspective on Supply Support Successes and Failures 
From the PM's perspective, the primary failure with supply support has been 
with replenishment of peculiar items that are common to the Air Force and/or Navy. Mr. 
Curtis Harold, an acquisition logistician at TAPO gave an example of a Navy managed item. 
He stated that there have been a couple of items that were managed by the Navy at the time 
of aircraft production, and the support arrangements were (supposedly) in place to support 
those peculiar items through the Navy system. Since that time, however, the Navy has 
surrendered item management responsibility to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Mr. 
Harold claims that the problem with this situation is that DLA has coded some of the items as 
obsolete because they didn't know that the 160th SOAR( A) was a user of the items. [Ref 27] 
Mr. Harold went on to state that this· situation has resulted in TAPO going out 
to the individual vendors of the supposedly obsolete items and contracting directly with them 
for the repair and replacement of that item. In effect, doing what DLA would have been 
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doing. He further claimed that BSAS could do the same thing, but that it would cost 17 to 20 
percent more for them to do it. [Ref 27] 
On the positive side, however, Major Parker points out that, "even with the 
problems we're having in some areas of supply support, the vast majority of our mission 
failures have been attributable to common items." He states that this is a testament to the 
effectiveness of the LCCS supply support arrangement, even with its inherent complexities. 
[Ref 20] 
h. The User's Perspective on Supply Support Successes and Failures 
The user identified two primary failures with the supply support. The first 
failure was noted by Major Books, Major Taliento, and CW2 Blasey. At the A VUM level, 
this failure is an inability to take peculiar and closed-loop items in the A VUM DSKs. CW2 
Blasey stated that they don't have the "authority" to carry· those items on deployments with 
them. What that means, as CW2 Blasey put it, is that "ifl've got four MH-60Ks on 'the road' 
for two weeks, it takes an act of God for me to get an mission processor or m~ltifunction 
display to take along as a spare. What I end up doing is relying on Federal Express to get me 
the parts." [Ref 21] 
At the A VIM level, this first failure manifests itself as a nonavailability of 
peculiar and closed-loop parts for the A VIM DSKs and "packages 1." Major Taliento states 
that, "I know that we've had the 'packages' missing some MH-60K peculiar and closed-loop 
parts." This is seen more as an initial provisioning failure than an actual failure in supply 
support. However, there is no solution in sight for the foreseeable future. [Ref 26] 
1 
"Packages" refer to the deployable parts supply that the A VIM units take on deployments. 
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The second failure was one of not accurately communicating the actual list of 
peculiar and closed-loop items and supply procedures to the actual users. CW2 Blasey 
provided the following example: 
Tailrotor servos are closed loop items. No body here knew that initially. So 
we took a UH-60L tailrotor servo, with no time on it, and installed it on an 
MH-60K. Fine, no problem we thought. Its the same servo - but as soon as 
we installed it in the MH-60K, it became a closed-loop item and we had to 
change the part number. This took a good tailrotor servo out of the regular 
supply system and added one to the closed-loop system. That caused a pretty 
big "stink." [Ref. 21] 
Aside from these failures, however, the supply support has, for the most part, 
performed extremely well. Major Taliento confirmed this by stating that, "there has not been 
an aircraft on the flight line that has been Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) for a peculiar 
or closed loop part." [Ref. 26] 
i. The Contractor's Perspective on Supply Support Successes and 
Failures 
The contractor identified one area as a great success in the supply support. 
That success is the ability to track failures in LRUs down to the subcomponent level and then 
to force vendors to correct identified weak components prior to replenishment. Mr. Porter 
uses the Integrated Avionics Subsystem as an example. He states: 
In the lAS, we've identified the weak link as the power supply. In the power 
supply, its predominately a failure in an R2 circuit where there is a cold solder. 
We just bought 50 more power supplies with improved R2 circuits in them. 
What makes this program different is, when I contract to buy replacement 
parts or replacement spares ... I'll buy them, but we want identified reliability 
improvements incorporated into the parts. We won't buy the some bad parts. 
And most of the time, the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) has already 
identified the deficiency because he is the one actually doing the overhaul on 
the item. [Ref. 24] 
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Mr. Porter further claims that this system is self correcting because the OEM is doing the 
depot level repairs instead of a Government facility. "It's inherently efficient." [Ref 24] 
j. The PM's Perspective on Supply Support Planning Shortfalls 
Even though supply support seems to be fairly effective, the PM commented 
on three areas that were lacking in supply support planning. The first planning shortfall, and 
potentially the most catastrophic to the program, was the intentional delay in procuring initial 
spares in an attempt to fund software problems. LTC Wayne Killian, the TAPO PM, stated 
that, "PM SOA pushed the initial spares to the right, and it looked as if the aircraft would be 
fielded with no spares. The only thing that saved the program from serious embarrassment 
was the fact that aircraft fielding was slipped to the right because of software problems." He 
went on to state that the fielding slip allowed the spares provisioning to catch up. This myopia 
was a serious shortfall in supply support planning. [Ref 28] 
The second planning shortfall was in initial spares provisioning and planning, 
and in spares replenishment planning. Ms. Lamsa stated that, even with the delay in fielding 
the aircraft, a complete provisioning package for peculiar and closed-loop parts was not in 
place at Ft. Campbell. She went on to say that, even after a year, "all of the initial spares are 
still not in place." Ms. Lamsa placed a portion of the blame for this on the slip in spares 
procurement and a portion of the blame on the fact that there has been at least "five or six 
major lists (of parts) that they have been trying to fill." [Ref 25] 
Mr. Harold concurred with these comments and also stated that, "apparently 
not enough forethought went into forecasting the additional requirements on replacement of 
closed loop items." As an example, he commented on the MH-60K main rotor spindle that 
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must be rebuilt during "phase" maintenance. He stated that, as of now, we (TAPO I 160th 
SOAR( A)) don't have enough parts to rebuild them because they were not provisioned for in 
the correct quantity. [Ref. 27] 
The third planning shortfall was in support arrangements for Army peculiar 
items that are Navy and/or Air Force common items. Major Parker stated that, "when an item 
becomes joint use, it is supposed to be managed by DLA. That has not occurred in many 
cases." [Ref 20] Mr. Harold echoed this comment by saying that support arrangements with 
the Navy and Air Force were never solidified. More importantly, he said, the 160th SOAR( A) 
was never a registered user with DLA for many of these items. Apparently, the initial spares 
were procured, but no plan was made for follow-on replenishment of the items. [Ref. 27] 
k. The User's Perspective on Supply Support Planning Shortfalls 
The user's comments on supply support planning shortfalls revolve around two 
of the same areas that the PM mentioned. First is the lack of support arrangements for Army 
peculiar parts that are Navy and/or Air Force common. Major (Promotable) Conway Ellers, 
the 160th SOAR( A) RAMO, stated that they were still trying to get access to some Navy and 
Air Force parts that are used on the MH-60K and MH-47E. He further stated that, "there are 
about 12 items that we don't have a Depot Support Agreement with the Navy or Air Force. 
Some of those items can be critical ... and we're having problems getting them." [Ref. 29] 
The second supply support planning shortfall is poor provisioning. Major 
Ellers gave an example ofthe MH-47E T-714 engine. He stated that since the engine is a 
peculiar item, it goes back to the manufacturer for maintenance. The problem is there were 
never any depot "bits and pieces" (i.e. nuts, bolts, seals, etc.) bought to support the depot at 
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the manufacturers facility. Major Ellers went on to say that the only thing keeping them 
"alive" with T-714 engines is the fact that they've got so many complete spare engines. [Ref 
29] 
CW2 Blasey provided a similar example of poor provisioning and no follow-on 
replenishment planning. He used the MH-60K roll trim servo as an example. He stated that: 
The roll trim servo is a peculiar item. They (PM SOA) only bought 25. 23 
of the 25 were installed on the original23 aircraft. That left two for spares. 
We've used the two spares over the past year and they (T APO) have never 
been able to reprocure them or got the bad ones fixed. [Ref 21] 
(It's important to note here that the MH-60K roll trim servo is a Navy common item used on 
the SH-60. Therefore, this ties back in with what TAPO and the 160th SOAR(A) RAMO 
commented on earlier about problems with support arrangements with the Navy and Air 
Force.) 
l. The Contractor's Perspective on Supply Support Planning Shortfalls 
The contractor identified two areas of supply support planning shortfalls. The 
first area was the slip in initial spares procurement. Mr. Brickner stated that, if it had not been 
for the delay in fielding the aircraft because of software problems, the initial spares would 
never have been in place to support the aircraft. He went on to say that, even with the delay, 
the quantity of spares that the 160th SOAR( A) wanted, and needed was not in place initially. 
[Ref 23] 
The second shortfall identified by the contractor was that of an inflexible 
contract for initial spares procurement. Mr. Brickner stated that, as the aircraft changed 
configuration, or someone identified a requirement for more of a given item in the "package," 
no mechanism was available to add those items to the initial spares buy. He further stated that 
107 
if the original provisioning list had been accurate, then a flexible contract would not have been 
necessary. However, given the complexity of the aircraft, the inexperience of the acquisition 
logisticians in PM SOA, and the poor LSA performed, it would have alleviated a lot of 
problems had the contractual device allowed for easy changes. [Ref 23] 
m Supply Support Analysis Summary 
In general, the supply support of the SOA is working acceptably at this time. 
It is important to note, however, that this acceptable level of supply support is not a result of 
a well written supply support section in the ILSP. The SOA ILSP failed to accurately and 
completely describe the supply support concept as it has actually been implemented. This 
failure is especially critical given the complexity of the SOA Program's supply support concept 
and the non-standard methods of implementing it. 
Additionally, recall from DODI 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management 
Policies and Procedures" [Ref 8] that provisioning for initial support as well as replenishment 
supply support is part of the definition of supply support. Also recall that the Government had 
the final decision on coding, range, and quantity of spare parts. This being the case, the 
Government,· and specifically PM SOA failed to adequately provision for initial spares. 
Additionally they failed to adequately plan for the replenishment and sustainment of peculiar 
items that are Navy and/or Air Force common items. They also failed in provisioning for 
initial support by allowing the initial spares procurement to be slipped to the right in an attempt 
to solve software problems. The only reason that the SOA were fielded with adequate spares 
was because the entire aircraft fielding was slipped to the right after additional software 
problems. 
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Even with these serious failures, the supply support for the SOA is working 
remarkably well. The concept as organized allows for the accurate identification of 
subcomponent failure trends by BSAS and ensures that spare replenishment only occurs after 
acceptable solutions to component and subcomponent failures have been implemented. 
Additionally, thus far, no NMCS time has been attributable to closed-loop or peculiar items. 
The user is still concerned with a couple of issues, however. First, is the lack 
of a workable solution for the support of peculiar items that are Navy and/or Air Force 
common. Second is the requirement to track and use two separate supply systems for repair 
parts. And third is the concern over peculiar and closed-loop supply procedures while 
deployed, given the fact that the A VUMs can't take any of these items with them, and that the 
A VIMs have holes in their "packages" due to poor provisioning of these items. 
Given these concerns, and the level of success that supply support has enjoyed 
thus far, the real test for supply support will come over the next year when the units begin their 
"normal" deployment schedules, and the new aircraft begin to show a little "wea~ and tear." 
It is important to note here that most of the references in the supply support 
analysis referred only to the MH-60K. This is due primarily to the fact that the MH-60K has 
been fielded longer than the MH-4 7E, and therefore has more data available for analysis. 
3. Support Equipment 
DODI 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures" [Ref. 8] 
defines support equipment as "all equipment, mobile or fixed, required to support the 
operation and maintenance of the system .... " Concentration on this ILS element is designed 
to ensure that all necessary Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE), Ground 
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Support Equipment (GSE), Automatic Test Equipment (ATE), etc., is acquired, modified, and 
in position to support the weapon system when fielded. Recall from chapter three that the 
general plan for support equipment was to maximize the use of "standard tools and TMDE" 
where Built in Test (BIT) and Built in Test Equipment (BITE) were not available. 
A support equipment "concept", per se, is not generally part of the ILS process or the 
ILSP. Therefore, the categories of"the concept" and "problems with the concept" were not 
analyzed in this section. Only the categories of "successes and failures" and "planning 
shortfalls" were analyzed. 
a. The PM's Perspective on Support Equipment Successes and 
Failures 
The PM was admittedly not aware of any specific successes or failures with 
regard to support equipment. 
b. The User's Perspective on Support Equipment Successes and 
Failures 
The user was quick to identify numerous failures with regard to support 
equipment All of the failures identified dealt with standard UH-60L and CH-47D TMDE not 
being modified for SOA use prior to aircraft fielding. Staff Sergeant Ross Pederson, the senior 
enlisted MH-47E crewmember assigned to the Systems Integration and Maintenance Office 
(SIMO) of the 160th SOAR(A), gave two specific examples pertaining to the MH-47E. 
Both items that Staff Sergeant Pederson discussed are critical to performing 
maintenance on the MH-47E. One item mentioned was the pitot static system test set and the 
other item was the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) test set. Neither one of these 
items had been modified to perform MH-47E peculiar tests prior to the aircraft being fielded. 
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Staff Sergeant Pederson stated that the only thing that saved the unit from grounding aircraft 
that needed the use of these items was the fact that the lAS FSR "came in, took the test sets 
apart, changed some stuff, and modified them to work." He further stated that, the only 
problem now is a lack of standard maintenance capability on the modified test sets. [Ref 30] 
Major Ellers and CW2 Blasey both discussed similar situations with MH-60K 
TMDE. Specifically, the critical Stability Augmentation System (SAS) I Stabilator test set was 
not modified prior to fielding. This piece of equipment is used on a daily basis by A VUM 
units and without it, aircraft requiring the test are reported as Non-Mission Capable 
Maintenance (NMCM). The MH-60K SAS I Stabilator test sets were modified in much the 
same way that the MH-47E TMDE was modified. [Ref 21 and 29] 
One final support equipment failure addressed by the user was the Automated 
Vibration Analysis (AVA) test set. This piece of equipment is used to conduct vibration 
analysis and smoothing on main rotors, tail rotors, high speed shafts, oil cooler shafts, etc. 
The AVA is used on all types of aircraft by changing the software "scripts" resident in its 
memory. Major Ellers stated that they still have not received the updated MH-60K or MH-
47E scripts. Therefore, the units are still conducting vibration analysis on the aircraft using 
either the UH-60L script for the MH-60K or the Helitune system for the MH-47E. [Ref 29] 
c. The Contractor's Perspective on Support Equipment Successes and 
Failures 
The contractor reiterated the points that the user made on support equipment 
failures. Primarily, the fact that many items ofTMDE were not modified for SOA use prior 
to aircraft fielding. Mr. Brickner specifically mentioned the MH-60K SAS I Stabilator test set 
problem and the AVA software scripts problem. [Ref 23] 
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d. The PM's Perspective on Support Equipment Planning Shortfalls 
Even though the PM did not mention any specific support equipment failures 
or successes, it did identify two significant shortfalls in support equipment planning. 
Lieutenant Colonel Killian stated that the biggest support equipment shortfall was the fact that 
PM SOA started buying equipment too late. Furthermore, they did not accurately identify 
existing support equipment that needed to be modified in order to work on the MH-60K and 
MH-47E. He went on to state that this was probably a result of insufficient LSA in the 
support equipment area. [Ref. 28] 
Major Parker and Ms. Lamsa both noted inadequate support equipment 
identification for use at the LCCS level as another support equipment planning shortfall. 
Major Parker stated that everyone involved would like to see a "better hot bench" (lAB) now. 
The current lAB only has the capability to identify whether or not a black box is good or bad. 
Major Parker said that "a more detailed capability, to identify down to the 'piece - part' 
level. .. , would alleviate good items being shipped back (to the manufacturer) for repair." 
[Ref. 20] Ms. Lamsa supplemented those comments with a claim that the depot at Allied 
Signal Engines (the T-714 engine manufacturer) "wants more test equipment" to facilitate the 
troubleshooting of engines. Right now, she claims, that "they're having horrendous 
turnaround times" on the engines and that the proper TMDE was never identified. [Ref. 25] 
e. The User's Perspective on Support Equipment Planning Shortfalls 
The user sees the only support equipment planning shortfall as a failure to get 
existing UH-60L and CH-47D TMDE modified to be useable on the MH-60K and MH-47E 
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prior to aircraft fielding. Other than this shortfall, the user claims that they were fielded all the 
peculiar SOA support equipment that they needed. 
f. The Contractor's Perspective on Support Equipment Planning 
Shortfalls 
The contractor concurred with the users identified planning shortfall, however, 
they also identified the lack of maintenance support and calibration for SOA support 
equipment as another support equipment planning shortfall. 
g. Support Equipment Analysis Summary 
In general, the SOA IT..,SP adequately covered the support equipment plan and 
requirements for the aircraft. This did not, however, alleviate problems with the 
implementation of this ILS element. 
The number one problem identified in the support equipment area was the 
failure to modify standard UH-60L and CH-47D TMDE for use on the MH-60K and MH-
4 7E prior to aircraft fielding. This problem, along with inadequate support equipment 
identification for use at the LCCS level, and the lack of maintenance support and calibration 
for SOA support equipment, appear to indicate inadequate LSA performance. 
Another key area of concern was the late buy of support equipment noted by 
Lieutenant Colonel Killian. The user, however, stated that they had all of the SOA peculiar 
TMDE that they needed when the aircraft were fielded. This phenomenon is probably 
attributable to the delay in aircraft fielding (noted in the section on supply support.) The 
fielding delay, in all probability, allowed the late buy of SOA peculiar TMDE to be in place 
when the aircraft finally arrived at Ft. Campbell. 
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Even with these problems, the support equipment area has not been a "show-
stopper" for the support of the SO A. This is due, to a large extent, to the delay in aircraft 
fielding and the expeditious TMDE modifications performed by the lAS FSRs. These two 
events allowed the support of the SOA to continue uninterrupted. 
4. Technical Data 
DODI 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures" [Ref. 8] 
defines technical data as "scientific or technical information recorded in any form or medium, 
such as manuals and drawings ... " Recall from chapter three that the prime contractors were 
directed to utilize current standard aircraft manuals as the baseline for the development of 
SOA aircraft manuals. Additionally, all publications to support the SOA were to be 
commercially prepared, updated, stocked, stored, and issued by their respective prime 
contractors. 
Although the ILS element of technical data typically encompasses more than just 
maintenance and operator publications, due to the NDI nature of_the SOA acquisition, 
maintenance and operator publications are all that were addressed in the SOA ILSP. This 
being the case, only this aspect of technical data is analyzed here. 
Also note that a technical data "concept", per se, is not generally part of the ILS 
process or the ILSP. Therefore, the categories of "the concept" and "problems with the 
concept" were not analyzed in this section. Only the categories of"successes and failures" and 
"planning shortfalls" were analyzed. 
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tL The PM's Perspective on Technical Data Successes and Failures 
The PM claims that there has been only one failure with regard to the ILS 
element of technical data. That failure is maintenance and operator publications. This just 
happens to be the only portion of technical data covered in the SOA ILSP. Although every 
person interviewed in T APO commented on the problems with SOA publications, they all said 
basically the same thing. Ms. Lamsa summed it up best when she said: 
Publications are a big problem. The customer (160th SOAR(A)) is still 
working with the original draft publications, with no changes or corrections 
since they were originally printed. . . . There are piles of tech changes that 
have never been incorporated into the publications because there is no system 
in place to do it. ... I don't think that unique publications are a good idea. 
[Ref. 25] 
b. The User's Perspective on Technical Data Successes and Failures 
Inaccurate and incomplete maintenance and operator publications, as well as 
late delivery of these publications depict what the user has lived with since day one with the 
SO A. To put this in perspective, of everything that could possibly go wrong with a new 
weapon system fielding, CW2 Blasey said that, without a doubt, "working through and with 
untested and inaccurate manuals was our biggest problem." But that was only a problem after 
they got some manuals. CW2 Blasey stated that the aircraft were not fielded with any 
publications. He went on to say that when they finally got manuals, they only got ten sets of 
draft copies. Additionally, he claimed that the draft manuals "were filled with an absolutely 
countless number of mistakes .... " [Ref. 21] 
Major Taliento continued the discussion of technical data failures by claiming 
that the maintenance publications that they have on hand now are outdated by at least 18 
months. He stated that one of the biggest problem areas is with the modifications that have 
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been installed on the aircraft since fielding. With regard to this, he said, "there is fragmented 
distribution of electrical drawings, and no cross check of tail number versus configuration (i.e. 
level ofMWOs applied.)" [Ref 26] CW2 Blasey confirmed these comments by claiming that 
"this aircraft has gone through a myriad of modifications already, and there is no way the 
publications will ever be able to keep up with the changes." [Ref 21] 
The only issue with regard to technical data that even closely resembles a 
success in the user's eye is the fact that the pilots and maintainers like an integrated publication 
to refer to. An integrated publication replaces multiple, contractor provided, maintenance and 
operator manuals that were provided with all previously fielded SOF modifications. [Ref 30] 
c. The Contractor's Perspective on Technical Data Successes and 
Failures 
Like the PM and the user, the contractor sees maintenance and operator 
publications as a major problem in the SOA Program. Apart :from the fact that complete and 
accurate publications were not available at the time of fielding, the contractor sees the lack of 
a system to correct these problems as the biggest failure requiring immediate attention. Mr. 
Porter claims that the user is almost back to where he was in terms of having separate 
maintenance and operator manuals for equipment that has been added to the aircraft. As an 
example ofthat, he noted that the "Storm Scope", which had just been installed at BGAD, 
was not addressed in the current maintenance or operator manuals. He stated that if a pilot 
wants to know how to operate the thing, he's got to go get a separate manual that contains the 
pertinent information. The problem here is, there is currently no system in place to get the 
Storm Scope information into the SOA integrated operators (or maintenance) manual. [Ref. 
24] 
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d. The PM's Perspective on Technical Data Planning Shortfalls 
According to the PM, a major change in the ILSP' s technical data plan late in 
the program seems to be the primary planning shortfall experienced in this area. The original 
plan was for the prime contractors to prepare, update, stock, and issue maintenance and 
operator publications. Somewhere along the line, this plan was changed, and a revised plan 
was apparently never developed to take its place. Therefore there is currently no system in 
place to update, revise, and correct existing manual. Ms. Lamsa concurred with this general 
statement and provided the following example of the problem. She stated that, if a 
maintenance procedure change occurs on the UH-60L, chances are, it will affect the MH-60K 
also, since they are the same basic airframe. The problem lies in the fact that there is no 
system in place now to get the procedure change from the UH-60L incorporated into the MH-
60K maintenance publications. This, in fact, becomes a significant safety issue. This same 
basic problem is also seen in SOA peculiar procedure changes, software changes, 
modifications, etc. There is currently no way to get those changes incorporated into the SOA 
maintenance and operator manuals. [Ref. 25] 
e. The User's Perspective on Technical Data Planning Shortfalls 
The user identified what they considered to be two technical data planning 
shortfalls. The first shortfall relates to the change in the ILSP technical data plan as mentioned 
by the PMO. Major Ellers stated that "part of the problem" came when the initial cost 
estimate was given for the technical data plan outlined in the ILSP. The initial estimate was 
approximately three million dollars per year to update, stock, store, and issue publications. 
Major Ellers claims that when PM SOA received the estimate, they determined that there was 
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no way the program could afford it. He claims that this is the reason that the technical data 
plan was changed. But it does not answer the question of why the estimate surprised PM 
SOA so late in the program. [Ref. 29] 
The second shortfall identified was inadequate time and resources to complete 
a thorough validation and verification (V ALNER) of the draft publications. Staff Sergeant 
Pederson stated that he only had six people and one week to conduct the V ALIVER on over 
20 manuals. In a statement to the obvious, Staff Sergeant Pederson said, "I think the 
requirement for the job (V ALIVER) was severely underestimated." [Ref. 30] 
f. The Contractor's Perspective on Technical Data Planning Shortfalls 
The contractor's comments on technical data planning shortfalls mimic those 
of the PM and user. It was very obvious to the contractor that no system was in place for 
maintenance and operator publication updates. Mr. Brickner emphasized that point when, he 
said that, "just today, CECOM (Communications, Electronics Command) finally agreed to 
take responsibility for the 11 series manuals." ( 11 series manuals are avionics manuals.) It is 
important to note that the date, "just today", was about a year after fielding the first aircraft. 
Until that agreement was reached, there was no system to update those manuals. [Ref. 23] 
One of the more interesting comments about technical data planning shortfalls 
was made by Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter stated that: 
When I first got on the program at Boeing, I told them that we needed to brief 
the status of the ten ILS elements to PM SOA. I did an assessment of where 
the program was on each of the elements and I coded it Red I Yell ow I or 
Green. The first time that I briefed PM SOA, when I flipped over the 
publications slide, and it was Red, everyone went- what do you mean we're 
Red? I said, publications are Red. We're three months from fielding, and you 
"got no books!" And you haven't run a V ALNER yet. That's supposed to 
be done at least a year out! [Ref. 24] 
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This obviously points to a deep rooted, long term problem within PM SOA's, and arguably 
the prime contractors, management of technical data. Mr. Porter claims that the first time a 
flag was raised about maintenance and operator publications not being validated, verified, and 
ready was three months prior to the original fielding date. This is borderline negligence on the 
acquisition logisticians at both PM SOA and the prime contractors. [Ref. 24] 
g. Technical Data Analysis Summary 
Everyone from the PM down to the mechanic agrees that maintenance and 
operator publications have been, and are, a big problem with the SOA Program. Publications 
were not delivered on time, when they were delivered, there was not enough of them, they 
were in draft form, they were inaccurate, and they were incomplete. 
The problem has not gotten any better with time. Currently, there is no system 
in place to incorporate changes and modifications to the manuals. This has resulted in 
mechanics performing maintenance on these sophisticated aircraft with outdated, inaccurate 
publications. 
The ILS element of technical data was poorly managed during the program. 
When the ILSP' s original technical data plan was altered, apparently no alternative plan was 
developed and/or implemented. The results of this poor management can be seen today by 
looking at the current state of the I 60th SOAR(A)'s unsafe SOA publications. 
C. MAJOR FACTORS IMPACTING THE SOA PROGRAM'S ILSP 
As stated previously, the primary purpose of this chapter is to identify the "major 
factors" that had a significant impact on the development and implementation of the SOA 
Program's ILSP. This section lists, in a concise manner, the major factors that I identified 
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from the analysis of the SOA Program's ILSP. These major factors are broken down into two 
categories. 
The first category is: The major factors that had a significant impact on the 
development of the SOA Program's ILSP. This category consists of the characteristics of the 
SOA Program itself that directly influenced the development of the ILSP. The items in this 
category are largely speculative in nature since no one from the actual ILSP development team 
could be located for comment. However, each items' relationship with the development of 
the ILSP was eluded to in one manner or another by comments from the interviewees. 
The second category is: The major factors that had a significant impact on the 
implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP. This category consists of the characteristics of 
the developed ILSP and the actions or inactions of the ILS Management Team (ILSMT) that 
significantly influenced the implementation of the ILSP. These items were derived directly 
from comments made during the interviews. 
1. The Major Factors That Bad a Significant Impact on the Development of 
the SOA Program's ILSP 
a. The Fact That the SOA was Designated a New Weapon System 
Acquisition Rather Than a Modification to the UH-60L and CH-
47D 
In my opinion, this item is the most significant factor listed. Prior to the MH-
60K and MH-47E, the I 60th SOAR(A) owned modified versions of the UH-60L and CH-
47D aircraft. Even though these aircraft were designated the MH-60L and MH-47D, airframe 
sustainment was the responsibility of PM Blackhawk (UH-60) and PM Chinook (CH-47). 
Only the unique modifications to these aircraft were the responsibility ofTAPO. That means 
that, supply support, publications support, sustaining engineering support, etc. was the 
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responsibility of these two PMOs and not TAPO. With the MH-60K and MH-47E however, 
complete aircraft sustainment became the responsibility ofT APO when PM SOA shut down. 
While T APO is manned with the best acquisition professionals in the business, 
it is my opinion that they are not manned to the level required to manage complete sustainment 
program management of two unique airframes and to continue their responsibility of 
developing, procuring, and sustaining modifications to all U.S. Army Special Operations 
Aviation aircraft. Furthermore, this arrangement is inherently inefficient because of the 
duplication of effort that results in three PMOs doing what should be the responsibility of two. 
b. The Fact That the SOA is an Integration of Highly Complex 
Systems Held Together by Software 
This item is one of many factors that resulted in the decision to provide 
maintenance and supply support with the LCCS concept. 
c. The Fact That the SOA Modifications Were Designed Around LRUs 
and BIT I BITE Type Troubleshooting 
This item is one of the main factors that resulted in the decision to utilize a 
"two-level" maintenance concept. 
d. The Fact That Funding, Manpower, and Training Resources Were 
Constrained 
While this item is not unique to the SOA Program, it is one of the many factors 
that resulted in the decision to provide maintenance and supply support with the LCCS 
concept. This item also resulted in some of the critical changes to the ILSP late in the 
Program. 
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e. The Apparent Fact That User Logistician Involvement Was Not 
Adequate 
This item is one of the main factors that resulted in numerous planning 
shortfalls, such as poor parts provisioning, publications failures, and TMDE failures. 
f. The Fact That the SOA is a Low Density Weapon System 
This item is another one of the many factors that resulted in the decision to 
provide maintenance and supply support with the LCCS concept Additionally, it is my 
opinion that the logistical consequences of this item were overlooked when the decision to 
establish a separate PMO was made. 
g. The Fact That the SOA Program was Designated an NDI 
Acquisition 
This item directly influenced the entire ILSP development. Since the SOA 
were basically modifications to existing aircraft, much of the usage data, reliability data, etc. 
was derived from UH-60 and CH-47 data. In my opinion, however, this fact lured PM SOA 
into a false sense of security believing that most of the supportability issues had already been 
addressed with the LSA conducted on the UH-60 and CH-47. 
2. The Major Factors That Had a Significant Impact on the Implementation 
of the SOA Program's asP 
a. The Fact That Life Cycle Contractor Support was Determined to be 
the Method of Maintenance and Supply Support for the SOA 
This item directly influenced every aspect of maintenance and supply support 
in the SOA Program. It has required a cultural shift in the way of performing maintenance 
in the I 60th SOAR(A) and, one year later, there are still mixed feelings on whether it is the 
right way of doing business. 
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b. The Fact That Supply Support for the SOA Consists of Two 
Separate and Independent Systems 
This item has resulted in a nonseamless supply system that requires tracking 
and maintenance of repair parts in two separate and dissimilar systems. 
c. The Apparent Fact That LSA was not Conducted to the Extent 
Necessary to Ensure That all ILS Elements Were Adequately 
Addressed 
This item has affected ILS aspects throughout the ILSP. Everything from 
maintenance task requirement inconsistencies to support equipment shortfalls appear to have 
suffered due to the apparent lack of thorough LSA. 
d. The Fact That the SOA Program was not Placed in the ILS 
Assessment File for LEA (now AMSAA) Review. 
If the SOA Program had been placed in the ILS assessment file, several of the 
ILS planning shortfalls could have, arguably, been alleviated. Therefore, this item is at least 
partially responsible for many of the problems experienced in the SOA Program's ILSP 
implementation. 
e. The Apparent Fact That the Logistics Functional Area Within PM 
SOA was Inadequately Prepared for the Job. 
This controversial item does not apply to every individual within the PM SOA 
Logistics Functional Area. It applies in a general sense to the entire group over the duration 
of the Program. This item is also partially responsible for many of the problems experienced 
in the SOA Programs ILSP implementation. 
f. The Fact That the SOA Fielding was Delayed 
This item actually allowed many of the ILS aspects of the SOA Program to 
"catch up." (i.e. initial spare parts, peculiar TMDE, etc ... ) 
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g. The Apparent Fact That Parts Provisioning was not Adequately 
Performed 
This item may be a result of inadequate LSA performance. Regardless, this 
item has resulted in shortages in the BSAS supply warehouse and the A VIM DSKs and 
packages. 
h. The Apparent Fact That Depot Support Agreements and 
Replenishment Agreements Were not Established With the Navy, 
Air Force, and DLAfor Certain Parts 
This item has caused problems in getting some Navy, Air Force, and DLA 
managed parts repaired and replaced. In some cases, separate contracts have had to be 
established by T APO in order to solve this problem. This item continues to be a major 
concern given the fact that parts are still being "discovered" that don't have support 
agreements established. 
i. The Fact That the Initial Spares Buy was Delayed 
This item, while a factor for consideration, ended up not causing extensive 
problems because the aircraft fielding was delayed. The delay in buying spares occurred prior 
to the decision to delay the aircraft fielding however. 
j. The Apparent Fact That the Technical Data Plan was Altered Late 
in the Program 
This item caused the critical publications problems that the 160th SOAR(A) 
has to this date. While all of the factors identified are important for one reason or another, this 
one has serious safety implications which must be solved immediately! 
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k. The Apparent Fact That Existing TMDE Modifications Were 
Overlooked as Part of the Support Equipment Plan 
This item may be a result of inadequate LSA performance. Regardless, this 
item resulted in a requirement to modify existing TMDE after the SOA were already fielded. 
Although the modifications were done in an expeditious manner with no aircraft "down time" 
attributable to TMDE, the situation could have been much different. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The main premise of this chapter was that interview comments made by people 
intimately involved with the ILS portion of an acquisition program can be used to effectively 
analyze a program's ILSP. And that from this analysis, major factors could be derived which 
significantly affect the development and implementation of that program's ILSP. Utilizing this 
premise, an analysis of the SOA Program's ILSP was conducted using interview comments 
from Technology Applications Program Office personnel, 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (Airborne) personnel, and Boeing I Sikorsky Aircraft Services personnel. These 
three groups of people are more familiar with the ILS of the SOA over the past year than 
anyone else in the U.S. Army. 
From this analysis, 18 major factors were identified that had a significant impact on 
the SOA Program's ILSP. Seven of these factors were derived from the characteristics of the 
SOA Program itself and the influence that they had on the development ofthe ILSP. The 
other eleven factors were derived from challenges faced during implementation of the SOA 
Program's ILSP. Combined, these 18 major factors form the basis of the lessons learned and 
conclusions discussed in the next chapter. 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In chapter I, two primary objectives were identified for this thesis. One of the 
objectives was to identify and examine the major factors in the SOA Program that had a 
significant impact on the development and implementation of the Program's ILSP. This 
objective was accomplished in the previous chapter. From these major factors, the second 
objective of the thesis is to develop ILS related lessons learned that will benefit acquisition 
managers and their staffs in the effective development and implementation ofiLSPs for low 
density NDI programs. 
This chapter begins with a section that lists the ILS related lessons learned developed 
from the major factors identified in chapter IV. The next section presents the broa~ 
conclusions that I have drawn from this study. The final two sections answer the research 
questions listed in chapter I and identify possible areas for further research. 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw the study together and provide the reader with 
logically drawn lessons learned and conclusions that other acquisition professionals might use 
in the development and implementation ofiLSPs in low density NDI programs. This then 
accomplishes the second objective of the thesis. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
The lessons learned listed in this section are the result of the analysis conducted on the 
implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP and the related major factors identified from that 
analysis. A key goal in the development of these lessons learned was to keep them non-system 
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specific in an attempt to make them usable by as large a number of acquisition professionals 
as possible. It is important to reemphasize the fact that the SOA Program was a low density 
acquisition that consisted of numerous items of"high tech" NDI equipment integrated with 
software. This makes the SOA Program somewhat unique in comparison to many programs, 
yet I submit that even with the peculiarities of this program, many of these lessons learned are 
applicable to all weapon system acquisitions. 
The lessons learned from the analysis of the SOA Program are: 
• Unless absolutely necessary (i.e. security reasons, completely unique item, etc.) do 
not establish a separate Program Management Office to develop, modify or 
procure low density weapons systems. Sustainment of low density weapon 
systems, especially modified versions of existing systems (i.e. the MH-60K and 
MH-47E) is far more complicated and expensive through separate small Program 
Management Offices than it is through existing Program Management Offices. 
• Integrated logistics support influence must be early, consistent, and persistent. The 
functional area of logistics is not "sexy", but, as discussed in chapter two, the 
implications ofiLS related decisions account for 70 percent of the life cycle costs 
of a weapon system. It is high time that this importance is emphasized. 
• Diverting funds away from ILS or delaying actions on ILS elements can have a 
devastating affect on the fielding and supportability of a weapon system. In the 
case of the SOA, if the aircraft fielding had not been delayed for software 
problems, it probably would have been delayed because of unprepared ILS 
elements. It is imperative that the PM safeguard ILS funds and that the Logistics 
Chief in the PMO be the chief proponent for safeguarding them. 
• Extreme diligence is required in ILS planning regardless of whether the program 
is a completely new weapon system like the RAH-66 Comanche, or a modification 
to an existing system like the MH-60K and MH-47E. Just because a system is an 
NDI modification doesn't make the ILS job any easier. This point is extremely 
important given the fact that the vast majority of the weapon system acquisitions 
in the near future are going to be modifications to existing systems because of the 
budgetary constraints that we are operating under. 
• The density of the weapon system being procured is one of the most important 
factors to consider when making key ILS decisions. This point is not mentioned 
in the current literature on ILS in NDI systems. Using contractor versus organic 
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support as an example, in general, if the weapon system is low density, favor 
contractor support. If the weapon system is high density, favor organic support. 
• No two acquisitions are the same, and no two ILSPs are the same. Every situation 
has its own unique requirements. It is imperative that acquisition logisticians 
remain flexible, innovative, and in touch with what the user needs and wants to 
support a new system. If the support system does not meet the needs of the user, 
if it is not "user" friendly, if it is not flexible enough, etc., then the acquisition 
logistician has failed at his I her job. 
• Logistical support analysis (LSA) tailoring, use, thoroughness, detail, etc. is critical 
to establishing and implementing successful ILS in weapon systems. 
Supportability success or failure depends on the diligence with which the LSA 
tasks are selected and accomplished. 
• If you are going to use the concept of Life Cycle Contractor Support (LCCS) for 
a weapon system, ensure that the mechanics, technicians, supply personnel, and 
managers to be hired are qualified to perform the job before awarding the contract. 
Additionally, ensure that key people know what they are getting for the money 
spent before awarding the contract. This seems like common sense, but apparently 
it is not. It all boils down to a clear, concise, well thought out and written 
Statement of Work (SOW). 
• The right amount of user involvement and interface with the PM is key to the 
success of a program. Not only operator involvement, but also maintainer 
involvement. A word of caution however. User involvement in a program can 
become a detriment if the PM allows the user to become involved to the point 
where they are "calling the shots." The PM is ultimately responsible for enforcing 
the "good idea cut off' window, and for conducting the cost benefit analysis of 
additional "goodies." (Sometimes that extra million dollars just isn't worth the one 
knot difference in top end airspeed. The PM has got to make the call.) 
• It is imperative that everyone involved in a unique supportability arrangement 
understand the concept, or intent, behind that arrangement. Without an 
understanding of the concept, the maintainers are like an infantry battalion going 
into battle without knowing the brigade commander's intent. Everything is great 
while its going according to plan, but sooner or later, things are going to start going 
wrong, and that's when everyone needs to know what and how things are really 
suppose to happen and what that end result is suppose to be. 
• Thoroughness in the planning, preparation and updating of the ILSP is critical to 
successful ILS in a weapon system. Failure to have a good plan that is continually 
updated during the life ofthe program is destined to result in mediocre ILS for the 
system. 
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• Acquisition logisticians must have a different mind set when dealing with a 
completely nonstandard support concept and ILSP. They must thoroughly 
understand the user and his requirements, as well as the implications of their 
decisions on the user's ability to support the weapon system in the field. 
• Oversight is not necessarily a "bad thing." Involvement with the Army Material 
Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) may be able to alleviate some problems that 
would otherwise be incurred. 
• Contractor versus organic support is one of the major decisions that must be made 
early in a program. Once the decision is made, the concept to support the decision 
must be exhaustively defined, codified, refined, and established. Too many other 
ILS decisions hinge on this decision to delay it. Vacillation on this decision is just 
as harmful and potentially more expensive than no decision at all. 
• If LCCS is determined to be the support concept for a weapon system, it is 
absolutely critical to the success of the support of that system that a proactive and 
knowledgeable Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) and Contracting 
Officer's Representative (COR) be assigned to ensure its proper execution. 
• Never, unless absolutely forced to, buy any peculiar item for a low density 
acquisition program. Modify, adapt, integrate, etc. existing items that have a 
support structure already in place. The time, effort, and expense required to 
establish a support base for low density peculiar items is prohibitively expensive. 
• Multiple maintenance contractors working in and for the same organization is not 
a wise decision. Inevitably comparisons, favoritism, and animosity build up, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of everyone involved. If multiple contractors 
are determined to be a preferred option, attempt to consolidate "like" tasks under 
single contracts so there is no overlap between contractors. 
• When using multiple sources of supply for repair parts (i.e. Army, Navy, Air 
Force, DLA) ensure that the user is a "registered user" of the system and that the 
required support and replenishment agreements are in place for the life of the 
system. 
• Strong, experienced acquisition logisticians are mandatory in complex NDI 
weapon system acquisitions. This is especially true in low density NDI programs. 
• Complex maintenance and supply concepts invite "challenges" for the user. 
Whenever possible, apply the adage of "KISS" -keep it simple (for the) soldier. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
1. ILS in NDI Programs 
Four general conclusions can be drawn from this thesis with respect to ILS in NDI 
programs. First, planning and implementation ofiLS in NDI programs can, and does, pose 
a challenge to the acquisition logistician and the PM community as a whole. This statement 
is not a real revelation in and of itself until you compare what current DoD literature claims 
to be the challenging areas of ILS in NDI to that which this study found to be the major 
challenging factors in the SOA Program. 
The publication SD-2, "Buying NDI" [Ref. 12] states that "shortened schedules, 
technology driven configuration changes, and greatly extended service life all contribute to the 
challenge ofNDI support." The Defense Systems Management College publication, "NDI 
Acquisition, an Alternative to 'Business as Usual,"' [Ref. 4] claims that the compressed 
acquisition life cycle and the rapidly evolving nature ofNDI hardware and software make ILS 
in NDI acquisitions significantly more difficult to manage. I submit that, while these 
statements may be true in some NDI programs (i.e. commercial ofthe shelf(COTS) type 
acquisitions), they are not true in all NDI programs. The SOA Program, which was not a 
COTS program, did not suffer from any of these "challenging" areas. 
This establishes the basis for my second general ILS conclusion. The current DoD 
literature that addresses ILS in NDI programs concentrates too heavily on COTS type 
acquisitions, and not on NDI acquisitions as a whole. Remember from chapter II that the 
Army breaks it's definition ofNDI down into three distinct categories: (1) off-the-shelf or 
basic NDI; (2) NDI adaptation; and (3) NDI integration. The challenges facing ILS 
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development in each of these three NDI categories is different. Current DoD literature does 
not effectively address these differences. 
The third general ILS conclusion that I drew from this thesis is that the relative density 
of a weapon system procurement is as important a consideration for ILS development as being 
an NDI acquisition is. Low density (low quantity) acquisitions, such as the SOA, require 
numerous unique supportability considerations. To the best of my knowledge, ILS 
considerations for low density weapon systems is not addressed in any DoD literature. 
The fourth and final general ILS conclusion drawn from this thesis is a restatement of 
a well known fact. The key to successful ILS planning and implementation is people. 
Tenacity and diligence in the ILS planning and implementation process by people who are 
qualified, innovative, motivated, and sensitive to the user's real needs will result in the 
successful ILS of new weapon systems. 
2. ILS in Low Density Weapon System Programs 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from this thesis with respect toILS in low 
density weapon system programs. First, as stated above, there is a critical shortage of DoD 
literature available on ILS considerations for low density weapon systems. I believe that this 
thesis has shown that unique ILS considerations do exist in low density weapon system 
acquisitions and therefore should be addressed accordingly. 
Second, never, unless absolutely necessary, (i.e. security reasons, completely unique 
item, etc.) establish a separate Program Management Office to develop, modifY or procure low 
density weapons systems. This is a reiteration of one of the major factors identified in chapter 
IV and one of the lessons learned listed in this chapter. Had the SOA Program been 
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established as a modification program under PM Blackhawk or PM Chinook (much like the 
UH-60Q Medevac Helicopter or the VH-60L VIP Helicopter), many of the sustainment 
problems and expenses that the SOA Program faced, and is currently facing, could have been 
eliminated. As an example, expenses such as sustaining engineering (mentioned in chapter IV) 
could be spread over a much higher number of aircraft, thus reducing the per unit cost of such 
expenses. Sustainment of low density weapon systems, especially modified versions of 
existing systems (i.e. the MH-60K and MH-47E) is far more complicated and expensive 
through separate small Program Management Offices than sustainment through an existing 
Program Management Office. 
3. ILS in the Special Operations Aircraft Program 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from this thesis with respect to ll..S in the SOA 
Program. First, the ILSP for the SOA Program was only adequately developed a~d 
implemented. The numerous ll..S planning shortfalls noted in the analysis portion of chapter 
IV were only overcome by the fact that the aircraft was delayed in fielding. As mentioned 
in the lessons learned of this chapter, chances are that the SOA fielding would have been 
delayed for insufficient ll..S even if it had not been experiencing the software problems that 
actually caused its fielding delay. This apparent fact leads to this conclusion. 
Second, the current support of the SOA is going exceptionally well, especially given 
the obstacles that the user had to overcome when the aircraft was first fielded. This current 
success in support of the aircraft is attributed to numerous factors. First and foremost, it is 
attributable to the experience, dedication, and tenacity of the soldiers of the I 60th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)). These men possess skills and abilities 
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not found in any other aviation organization in the U.S. Army. Second, it is attributable to 
the fact that the aircraft are still relatively new. And third, it is at least partially attributable to 
the maintenance and supply concept in place to support the aircraft. The concept itself is fairly 
sound, it was the detailed planning and execution that caused the problems with ILS. 
D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section provides summarized answers to the questions which guided this research. 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question for this thesis is: What major factors in the SOA 
Program had a significant impact on the development and implementation of the 
Program's ILSP and what lessons can be learned from those factors? 
The following major factors were identified in chapter IV as having a significant 
impact on the development of the SOA Program's ILSP: 
• The fact that the SOA was designated a new weapon system acquisition rather 
than a modification to the UH-60L and CH-47D. 
• The fact that the SOA is an integration of highly complex systems held together 
by software. 
• The fact that the SOA modifications were designed around LRUs and BIT I BITE 
type troubleshooting. 
• The fact that funding, manpower, and training resources were constrained. 
• The apparent fact that user logistician involvement was not adequate. 
• The fact that the SOA is a low density weapon system. 
• The fact that the SOA Program was designated an NDI acquisition. 
The following major factors were identified in chapter IV as having a significant 
impact on the implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP: 
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• The fact that LCCS was determined to be the method of maintenance and supply 
support for the SO A. 
• The fact that supply support for the SOA consists of two separate and independent 
systems. 
• The apparent fact that LSA was not conducted to the extent necessary to ensure 
that all ILS elements were adequately addressed. 
• The fact that the SOA Program was not placed in the ILS assessment file for LEA 
(now AMSAA) review. 
• The apparent fact that the logistics functional area within PM SOA was 
inadequately prepared for the job. 
• The fact that the SOA fielding was delayed. 
• The apparent fact that parts provisioning was not adequately performed. 
• The apparent fact that depot support agreements and replenishment agreements 
were not established with the Navy, Air Force, and DLA for certain parts. 
• The fact that the initial spares buy was delayed. 
• The apparent fact that the technical data plan was altered late in the program. 
• The apparent fact that existing TMDE modifications were overlooked as part of 
the support equipment plan. 
The following lessons learned were identified at the beginning of this chapter: 
• Sustainment of low density weapon systems, especially modified versions of 
existing systems (i.e. the MH-60K and MH-47E) is far more complicated and 
expensive through separate small Program Management Offices than it is through 
existing Program Management Offices. 
• Integrated logistics support influence must be early, consistent, and persistent. 
• Diverting funds away from ILS or delaying actions on ILS elements can have a 
devastating affect on the fielding and supportability of a weapon system. 
• Extreme diligence is required in ILS planning regardless of whether the program 
is a completely new weapon system or a modification to an existing system. 
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• The density of the weapon system being procured is one of the most important 
factors to consider when making key ILS decisions. 
• It is imperative that acquisition logisticians remain flexible, innovative, and in 
touch with what the user needs and wants to support a new system. 
• Logistical support analysis (LSA) tailoring, use, thoroughness, detail, etc. is critical 
to establishing and implementing successful ILS in weapon systems. 
• If you are going to use the concept of Life Cycle Contractor Support (LCCS) for 
a weapon system, ensure that the mechanics, technicians, supply personnel, and 
managers to be hired are qualified to perform the job before awarding the contract. 
• The right amount of user involvement and interface with the PM is key to the 
success of a program. 
• It is imperative that everyone involved in a unique supportability arrangement 
understand the concept, or intent, behind that arrangement. 
• Thoroughness in the planning, preparation and updating of the ILSP is critical to 
successful ILS in a weapon system. 
• Acquisition logisticians must have a different mind set when dealing with a 
completely nonstandard support concept and ILSP. 
• Oversight is not necessarily a "bad thing." 
• Contractor versus organic support is one of the major decisions that must be made 
early in a program. 
• If LCCS is determined to be the support concept for a weapon system, it is 
absolutely critical to the success of the support of that system that a proactive and 
knowledgeable Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) and Contracting 
Officer's Representative (COR) be assigned to ensure its proper execution. 
• Never, unless absolutely forced to, buy any peculiar item for a low density 
acquisition program. 
• Multiple maintenance contractors working in and for the same organization is not 
a wise decision. 
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• When using multiple sources of supply for repair parts (i.e. Army, Navy, Air 
Force, DLA) ensure that the user is a "registered user" of the system and that the 
required support and replenishment agreements are in place for the life of the 
system. 
• Strong, experienced acquisition logisticians are mandatory in complex NDI 
weapon system acquisitions. This is especially true in low density NDI programs. 
• Complex maintenance and supply concepts invite "challenges" for the user. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is integrated logistics support; what is nondevelopmental item 
acquisition; and, how does integrated logistics support differ in 
nondevelopmental item acquisitions? 
Integrated logistics support is: 
a disciplined, unified and iterative approach to the management and technical 
activities necessary to: 
1. Develop support requirements that are related consistently to 
readiness objectives, to design, and to each other; 
2. Integrate support considerations effectively into the system and 
equipment design; 
3. Identify the most cost-effective approach to supporting the system 
when it is fielded; and 
4. Ensure that the required support structure elements are developed 
and acquired. [Ref. 8] · 
Nondevelopmental item acquisition is generally considered the acquisition of 
any of the following items: 
• Any item available in the commercial marketplace. 
• Any previously developed item in use by the U.S. Government or cooperating 
foreign governments. 
• Any item of supply needing only minor modifications to meet DoD requirements. 
137 
The Army breaks these items down into the following specific categories: 
• Off-the-shelf or basic NDI -- used in the same environment for which items were 
designed and no development or modification is required. 
• NDI adaptation-- products needing adaptation for use in an environment different 
from that for which they were designed. 
• NDI integration -- integrating NDI components and subsystems. 
ILS in NDI acquisitions differs from ILS in developmental acquisitions 
primarily due to the significantly more difficult challenges that acquisition personnel must face. 
Some of the challenges that acquisition personnel must face in ILS for NDI systems include: 
• The compressed acquisition life-cycle. 
• The rapidly evolving nature ofNDI hardware and software. 
• The limited ability of the developing agency to influence the system design. 
• The debate over contractor versus organic support. 
• The determination of responsibility for sustaining program management. 
This all boils down to one thing: there is not an "ideal" or "text book" solution 
to support for NDis. Acquisition personnel must understand that implementing effective ILS 
for NDI will require a departure from the "normal" procedures of a developmental item 
acquisition. As long as the unique requirements and concerns of each NDI program are 
recognized and considered, effective ILS can be achieved for the life of an NDI. 
b. What is the Special Operations Aircraft Program, and to what extent 
are the aircraft in this program modified over regular Army 
aircraft? 
The SOAProgram is an initiative by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
in response to the Department of Defense Special Operations Forces Airlift Report and the 
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Special Operations Forces Expedited Essential Required Operational Capability, to provide 
aircraft capable of performing clandestine, deep penetration airlift missions in adverse weather 
with limited lighting and visibility during night or day conditions over all types of terrain. 
The SOA Program entailed the design, integration, modification, and 
qualification of a Mission Equipment Package (MEP) to enhance the operational capability of 
the UH-60L and CH-47D. The MEP included: (1) an Integrated Avionics Subsystem to 
enhance the communications and navigation capability ofthe aircraft; (2) an improved Aircraft 
Survivability Equipment suite; (3) more powerful armament; (4) the addition of external and 
internal fuel tanks and air -to-air refueling provisions; ( 5) upgraded transmissions (MH-60K 
only); and (6) upgraded engines (MH-47E only). 
c. What are the specifics of the Special Operations Aircraft Program's 
Integrated Logistics Support Plan? 
See section C, part two of chapter III in this thesis for the specific details of the 
SOA Program's ILSP. In brief, the most important aspect ofthe Program's ILSP was the 
direction provided to pursue a two level life cycle contractor support concept for the 
maintenance and supply of the aircraft. This decision effectively influenced every aspect of 
ILS for the aircraft from reliability, availability, and maintainability objectives to support 
resource funding. The SOA Program's ILSP is a good example of unique requirements and 
concerns being recognized and considered in the development of a support plan. 
d. Has the Special Operations Aircraft Program's Integrated Logistics 
Support Plan been successfully implemented? 
The ILSP for the SOA Program was successfully implemented. However, this 
is a qualified statement. First, the numerous ILS planning shortfalls noted in the analysis 
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portion of chapter IV were only overcome by the fact that the aircraft was delayed in fielding. 
As mentioned in the lessons learned of this chapter, chances are the SOA fielding would have 
been delayed for insufficient ILS if it had not been for the software problems that actually 
caused its fielding delay. 
Second, while the current support of the SOA is going well, this is attributed 
to numerous factors other than an exceptional ILSP. The most important factor attributing 
to the current success is the experience, dedication, and tenacity of the soldiers of the I 60th 
SOAR( A). It is my sincere belief that a regular aviation unit would not have been able to 
successfully support the SOA up to this point. The other key factor attributing to the current 
success is the fact that the aircraft are still relatively new. 
e. What factors were identified as critical during the development and 
implementation of the Special Operations Aircraft Program,s 
Integrated Logistics Support Plan? · 
The major factors identified as having a significant impact on the development 
and implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP are listed in section C of chapter IV and 
section D, part one of this chapter. I consider the following factors as the most critical in the 
development and implementation of the SOA Program's ILSP. 
( 1) Critical Development Factors: 
• The fact that the SOA was designated a new weapon system acquisition rather 
than a modification to the UH-60L and CH-47D. 
• The fact that the SOA is a low density weapon system. 
(2) Critical Implementation Factors: 
• The fact that LCCS was determined to be the method of maintenance and supply 
support for the SO A. 
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• The fact that supply support for the SOA consists of two separate and independent 
systems. 
• The apparent fact that LSA was not conducted to the extent necessary to ensure 
that all ILS elements were adequately addressed. 
• The apparent fact that the logistics functional area within PM SOA was 
inadequately prepared for the job. 
f. What Integrated Logistics Support related lessons learned can be 
gained from the Special Operations Aircraft Program? 
The ILS related lessons learned from the SOA Program are listed in section 
B of this chapter and part one of section Din this chapter. I consider the following lessons 
learned as the most relevant to a broad range of Programs Managers: 
• Sustainment of low density weapon systems, especially modified versions of 
existing systems (i.e. the MH-60K and MH-47E) is far more complicated and 
expensive through separate small Program Management Offices than it is through 
existing Program Management Offices. 
• The density of the weapon system being procured is one ofthe most important 
factors to consider when making key ILS decisions. 
• Logistical Support Analysis (LSA) tailoring, use, thoroughness, detail, etc. is 
critical to establishing and implementing successful ILS in weapon systems. 
• It is imperative that everyone invoh:ed in a unique supportability arrangement 
understand the concept, or intent, behind that arrangement. 
• Acquisition logisticians must have a different mind set when dealing with a 
completely nonstandard support concept and ILSP. 
• Contractor versus organic support is one of the major decisions that must be made 
early in a program. 
• Never, unless absolutely forced to, buy any peculiar item for a low density 
acquisition program. 
• Strong, experienced acquisition logisticians are mandatory in complex NDI 
weapon system acquisitions. This is especially true in low density NDI programs. 
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E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As a result of this study, I have identified the following areas for consideration of 
further research. These areas are broken down into quantitative areas, qualitative areas, and 
"combination" areas. 
1. Quantitative Areas for Further Research 
a. Cost Analysis of Low Density Weapon System Support Through an 
Existing Program Management Office Versus Support Through a 
New, Separate Program Management Office 
Research in this area could explore the theoretical cost difference between 
development and support of the SOA Program by the Blackhawk PM (or Chinook PM) versus 
development of the aircraft by the SOA PMO and support of the aircraft by the Technology 
Applications Program Office (TAPO). 
b. Life Cycle Cost Comparison of an all Organic Maintenance Concept 
to a Life Cycle Contractor Support Maintenance Concept 
Research in this area could consist of a theoretical comparison of the life cycle 
cost differences in the SOA Program under the current LCCS concept versus an all organic 
maintenance concept. A twist on this approach could be to conduct a cost analysis on various 
hybrids of these concepts and make a recommendation for a give support concept. 
2. Qualitative Areas for Further Research 
· a. Development of Specific Integrated Logistics Support 
Considerations in Low Density Weapon System Acquisitions 
Research in this area could survey a large number of low density weapon 
system programs and establish a list of considerations that PM personnel in these programs 
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feel impacted their programs. This could be integrated into a proposed change or addition to 
current literature on ILS and submitted to the Defense Systems Management College. 
b. A Case Study on the Integrated Logistics Support Planning Thus 
Far in a Current Major Weapon System Acquisition 
Research in this area could explore the ILS planning considerations thus far in 
a major weapon system such as the RAH-66 Comanche Program or the Joint Advanced Strike 
Technology Aircraft Program. A twist on this would be to conduct a analysis of the ILS 
planning conducted on a program that has had sustainment problems, such as the AH-64 
Apache, and compare it to a current program such as the RAH-66 Comanche. 
3. Combination Areas for Further Research 
a. A Detailed Study on How Many Acquisition Programs Have Had 
Integrated Logistics Support Delays and the Common Effects of 
Those Delays 
Research in this area could survey a large number of acquisition programs to 
determine how many of them experienced delays in one or more ILS elements (i.e. delay in 
initial spares procurement, etc ... ) The research could continue on to determine the common 
effects of those delays and the reasons for them. An alternative to this would be to choose one 
or two elements and perform a detailed analysis of the cost of the delays in those element( s ). · 
b. An Analysis of the Market Investigation I Analysis Performed Prior 
to a Recent, Major Nondevelopmentalltem Acquisition 
Research in this area could analyze the market investigation I analysis 
performed on a recent, major, successful NDI acquisition such as the Army's "New Training 
Helicopter." This analysis could culminate in a list of lessons learned from this analysis. 
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F. A FINAL THOUGHT 
ILS development and implementation for any acquisition program is a challenging and 
:frustrating job. Developing and implementing responsive, cost effective ILS in other than the 
"typical" text book developmental program can challenge the PM and his logisticians beyond 
anything that they've been trained to handle. 
The SOA Program is one such program that challenged the entire PMO. This thesis 
analyzed the challenges faced by the SOA PMO during the implementation of their ILSP. In 
order to put the "major factors" and lessons learned listed in this thesis into perspective, it is 
important to state two critical items which must be considered when looking at these results. 
First, at the time that I conducted the interviews used in this thesis, the SOA had only 
been in the field for about one year. Because of this, the support for these aircraft should still 
be considered in the infancy stage. The support structure is experiencing the same growing 
pains that every new weapon system experiences when first fielded. It would be wrong to 
expect any new weapon system to be fielded with no supportability problems. 
Even considering this first item, the SOA Program experienced some serious ILS 
development and implementation problems which it should not have. That brings me to the 
second item that must be considered by the readers of this thesis. The 160th SOAR( A) is not 
the typical Army organization. The organization has 15 years of experience dealing with 
nonstandard equipment and maintenance procedures. This fact allowed the SOA to be fielded 
with a "less than perfect" ILSP and to overcome all of the challenges mentioned in this thesis. 
Fielding a new, highly complex weapon system, with a nonstandard support 
arrangement to an organization that does not have experience dealing with this type of 
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arrangement may encounter more challenges than this thesis has brought to light. Program 
managers and acquisition logisticians must consider this when looking at the "major factors" 
and lessons learned identified here. 
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APPENDIX A. ACRONYM LIST 
The following is a consolidated list of acronyms found throughout this thesis: 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ADF Automatic Direction Finder 
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System 
AI-IRS Attitude Heading Reference System 
AM Amplitude Modulating 
AMC Army Material Command 
AMSAA Army Material Systems Analysis Activity 
ANVIS Aviator Night Vision Imaging System 
Ao Operational Availability 
APM Assistant Program Manager 
AR Army Regulation or Aerial Refueling 
ARMS Aviation Resource Management Survey 
ASE Aircraft Survivability Equipment 
ATCOM Aviation Troop Command 
ATE Automatic Test Equipment 
ATHS Air Target Handover System 
AVA Automatic Vibration Analysis 
A VIM Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 
























Aviation Unit Maintenance 
Blue Grass Army Depot 
Boeing Helicopter Company 
Built in Test 
Built in Test Equipment 
Boeing I Sikorsky Aircraft Services 
Continuous Acquisition and Life Cycle Support 
Corpus Christi Army Depot 
Commodity Command Standard System 
Control Display Unit 
Communications Electronics Command 
Concept Exploration and Definition 
Cargo Helicopter 
Contractor Logistics Support 
Cockpit Management System and Combat Mission Simulator 
Contracting Officer Representative 
Commercial Off the Shelf 
Computer Resource Life Cycle Management Plan 
Computer Resource Management Plan 
Continuous Wave 
Chief Warrant Officer 
Command and Control 
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DA Department of the Army 
DA PAM Department of the Army Pamphlet 
DAP Defensive Armed Penetrator 
DC SLOG Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 
DEMV AL Demonstration and Validation 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
DLSIE Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 
DMMH/FH Direct Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department ofDefense Directive 
DoD I Department of Defense Instruction 
DP Display Processor 
DSK Deployment Support Kit 
DSMC Defense Systems Management College 
DTIC Defense Technology Information Center 
EL T · Emergency Locator Transmitter 
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
ETS External Tank Support 
F Fahrenheit 
F ADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

























Forward Looking Infra-Red 
Frequency Modulating 
Fully Mission Capable 
Foreign Military Sales 
Follow On Test and Evaluation 
Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System 
Field Service Representative 
Fiscal Year 
General Electric 
Global Positioning System 
Glide Slope 
Ground Support Equipment 
High Frequency 
Integrated Avionics Bench 
Integrated Avionics Subsystem 
International Business Machine 
Interference Blanker Unit 
Identification Friend or Foe 
Independent Government Cost Estimate 
Instructor and Key Personnel Training 




















Integrated Logistics Support Management Team 
Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
Inertial Navigation Unit 
Interservice Supply Support Agreements 
Integrated Support Plan 
Integrated Training System 
Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
Kilo Hertz 
Logistics Assistance Representative 
Life Cycle Cost 
Life Cycle Contractor Support 
Logistics Evaluation Activity 
Localizer 
Line Replaceable Unit 
Logistics Support Analysis 
Logistics Support Analysis Record 
Lower Side Band 
Maintenance Allocation Chart 
MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration 
MB Marker Beacon 
MC Mission Capable 
























Maintenance Engineering Analysis 
Mission Equipment Package 
Multifunction Display 





Mission Need Statement 
Military Operational Specialties 
Mission Processor 
Mean Sea Level 
Mean Time Between Essential Maintenance Actions 
Mean Time Between Mission Abort 
Mean Time To Repair 
Modification Work Order 
Missile Warning Set 
National Command Authority 
Nondirectional Beacon 
Nondevelopmental Item 
New Equipment Training 

























Non Mission Capable 
Non Mission Capable Maintenance 
Non Mission Capable Supply 
Original Equipment Manufacturer 
Out of Ground Effect 
Operator, Maintainer, and Support 
Operational Requirements Document 
Operations and Maintenance 
Operational and Organizational 
Preliminary Airworthiness Evaluation 
Post Deployment Software Support 
Program Executive Office 
Peculiar Ground Support Equipment 
Prime Item Development Specification 
Packaging, Handling, and Storage 
Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation 
Personnel Locator System · 
Program Manager 
Partially Mission Capable 
Program Management Office 
























Program of Instruction 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Post Production Support 
Post Production Support Plan 
Part Task Trainer 
Quality Assurance Representative 
Reconnaissance I Attack Helicopter 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
Regiment Aviation Maintenance Officer 
Required Operational Capability 
Remote Terminal Unit 
Reparable Exchange 
Research and Development 
Reliability and Maintainability 
Sikorsky Aircraft 
Stability Augmentation System 
Satellite Communication 
Support Equipment 
Systems Integration and Management Office 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 
Special Operations Aircraft 
























Special Operations Forces 
Special Operations Forces Support Activity 
Statement of Work 
System Readiness Objective 
Standardization and Interoperability 
Terrain Avoidance 
Technology Applications Program Office 
Training Device System 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Terrain Following 
Technical Manual 
Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment 
Test Program Sets 
Training and Doctrine Command 
Technical Test 
Test and Evaluation 
Utility Helicopter 
Ultra High Frequency 
Upper Side Band 
United States Special Operations Command 
Validation I Verification 
Very High Frequency 
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VIP Very Important Person 
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio 
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MH-47E INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT SCHEDULE 
MAJOR DECISION REVIEWS 
INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT 
MANAGEMENT TEAM (ILSMT) MEETINGS 
TRAINING 
LSA GUIDANCE CONF/REVIEWS 
GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT 
INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLAN 
RELIASILITY REPORT (FROM SOEING) 
M 
MAINTAINASILITY REPORT (FROM SOEING) 
TECHNICAL MANUALS (AVUM) 
TRANSPORTASILITY REPORT 
FY 88 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 
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